Can Good Products Drive Out Bad?
A Randomized Intervention in the Antimalarial Medicine Market in Uganda *

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Abstract

How can quality be improved in markets in developing countries, which are known to be plagued by substandard and counterfeit (“fake”, in short) products? We study the market for antimalarial drugs in Uganda, where we randomly assign entry of a retailer (NGO) providing a superior product - an authentic drug priced below the market - and investigate how incumbent firms and consumers respond. We find that the presence of the NGO had economically important effects. Approximately one year after the new market actor entered, the share of incumbent firms selling fake drugs dropped by more than 50% in the intervention villages, with higher quality drugs sold at significantly lower prices. Household survey evidence further shows that the quality improvements were accompanied by consumers expecting fewer fake drugs sold by drug stores. The intervention increased use of the antimalarial drugs overall. The results are consistent with a simple model where the presence of a seller committed to high quality, as opposed to an average firm, strengthens reputational incentives for competing firms to improve quality in order to not be forced out of the market, leading to ‘good driving out bad’.

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1 Introduction

Malaria remains one of the major health problems in Africa, despite the existence of effective prevention methods and curative medicines such as artemisinin-based combination therapy (ACT).\(^1\) While the reason for this public health failure is multifaceted, recent evidence from retail markets for antimalarial drugs suggests that poor quality of medicines is a contributing factor.\(^2\) Understanding the determinants of drug quality in this market is important from a public health perspective. Beyond these concerns, the market for antimalarial medicine offers a unique setting for studying the theory of markets and product quality: antimalarial medicine is an experience/credence good, in the sense that quality is unknown to the consumer prior to consumption, and may only be partially observable afterwards.\(^3\) While the health experience after consumption may provide information about the quality of the product, inference is imperfect. What compounds the inference problem is that when the underlying disease, in this case malaria, is not perfectly known to the consumer feeling ill - which is the typical case in most of sub-Saharan Africa where modern diagnostics are either unavailable or seldom used - then even if treatment is unsuccessful, one cannot confidently infer quality of the drug, because the consumer may not have had the presumed disease (malaria) in the first place. It is clear that standard forces for reputation building among firms are relatively weak in such a context, as one can get away with selling poor quality medicines without suffering much in terms of reputation. What is less clear, however, is what may move the market out of this suboptimal equilibrium.

To our knowledge, we are the first to provide experimental evidence on the determinants of drug quality among firms in a developing country context.\(^4\) We collaborated with an NGO, Living Goods, that entered local markets (villages) where local saleswomen were selling antimalarial medicines (ACTs), among other products. Living Good’s ACTs were highly competitive as they were superior in both quality and price: the ACTs were authentic - and thus of the highest possible quality - and were aggressively priced below

\(^1\)In Africa alone, there were an estimated 215 million cases of malaria in 2019 and roughly 384,000 deaths (WHO, 2020).
\(^2\)In a meta-analysis of papers conducting chemical analyses of antimalarial drugs in Southeast Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, Nayyar et al. (2012) estimate that 32% of the tested samples contained too little or no active pharmaceutical ingredients, or contained an unstated drug or substance.
\(^3\)The distinction between the term experience good and credence good typically refers to the degree to which consumers can infer quality after consumption, where for experience goods quality is revealed and for credence goods it is not.
\(^4\)The closest paper is by Bennett and Yin (2019), which uses non-experimental data to investigate the impact of chain store entry on the quality of antibiotics in Hyderabad, India. Their results echo some of our findings, but in a different market where drug quality appears to be higher.
prevailing market prices (typically 20%-30% below). We collected data on drug quality and prices among incumbent drug stores using mystery shoppers slightly less than one year after the Living Good’s saleswomen had entered the villages. Following established testing methods (Raman spectroscopy) we measured whether the drugs were authentic or not (fake), where the latter case meant that the drug did not contain the ingredients that it should according to the authentic standard. It is important to note that the methodology does not distinguish between underlying reasons for why a drug fails the test, it could be due to no or low dose of the active ingredient, degradation due to unsuitable storage conditions, insufficient complementary ingredients, etc. We call these failed samples fake or low-quality, which include cases where the drug originated from the authentic manufacturer, but for whatever reason did not meet the quality standard of that drug at the time of testing. We combine this data with household surveys to measure responses on the demand side, including quantities demanded and the reputation of local drug stores.

To fix ideas and guide the empirical analysis, we start by presenting a simple model. In markets for goods with unknown quality before purchase, a firm’s incentive to provide high-quality goods crucially hinges on consumers’ ability to learn about quality after purchase (Mailath and Samuelson, 2001; Shapiro, 1982). We build our model based on this insight, but adapt it to the context of antimalarial drugs. Specifically, learning about quality based on health outcomes is hampered by the fact that consumers do not know the exact cause of their fever (malarial or a non-malarial illness, but with similar symptoms). In such a context, our model predicts, the presence of a retailer that is committed to high quality (such as the NGO in our experiment) is key for improving quality in the market. Simply put, when such a seller is present, as opposed to an average firm, it becomes more difficult for an opportunistic, profit-maximizing competitor to get away with selling low-quality drugs, because consumers can learn about drug quality by comparing health outcomes of consumers who are treated by antimalarial drugs from the different sellers. More broadly, our model delivers a set of testable predictions on how entry of a seller committed to high quality affects the market equilibrium in terms quality, exit and price among incumbents, and beliefs about quality and quantity demanded among consumers.

We first study the supply side by providing evidence on how incumbent drug stores responded to the NGO. We then examine the demand side, using survey data on how

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5The saleswomen were selling a basket of goods, including other health products (e.g., pain killers, oral rehydration therapy, etc.). While this approach may have been important for the sustainability of the business model, and for what the potential health impact could be, it is unlikely that these other products had a first-order effect on the quality of antimalarial drugs studied in this paper.

6Using WHO terminology, we are examining Substandard/Spurious/Falsely-Labelled/Falsified/Counterfeit medical products, or SSFFC drugs. We discuss definitions and measurement in detail in Section 4.
households responded. At endline, the share of firms selling fake ACTs was more than 50% lower in the intervention relative to the control villages. The model outlines two mechanisms through which this reduction could come about. When consumers have some ability to infer quality, there could be exit of drug stores selling bad quality ACTs from the market (extensive margin) or a switch from selling low-quality to high-quality drugs among incumbents who remain in the market (intensive margin). Which effect will dominate depends on the degree of price undercutting by the NGO; the exit effect will be dominating only if the NGO sets a price far below the market price, but otherwise the effect on quality will be driven by quality adjustments. The evidence suggests that both mechanism were at play, although we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no differential exit in the two assignment groups. Finally, entry of the NGO also resulted in a 16% lower market price among incumbents. This is broadly speaking in line with our model, which predicts that incumbents will pool on the price set by the NGO. Beyond the model, however, the evidence clearly points to the existence of not only low quality in the retail market, but also significant ex ante mark-ups most likely due to lack of competition.

We then use household survey data to examine demand responses to the intervention and the improved market conditions. According to our model, there are multiple mechanisms at play driving demand. On the one hand, there is an obvious, direct, substitution effect where some consumers switch to the NGO. This force reduces demand for the incumbent. On the other hand, there are counteracting forces. If the NGO undercuts the incumbent by setting a lower price, and the incumbent pools on the lower price, there is a price effect which means that quantity demanded from the incumbent increases. On top of this effect, there is the beliefs effect as our model predicts that consumers will expect higher quality from incumbents on average in equilibrium, which shifts the demand curve outward. The net effect of these forces on quantity demanded from incumbents is ambiguous, although overall quantity should increase. We first show that there is a counteracting force through an effect on beliefs: households in intervention villages were about 20% less likely to believe that incumbent stores sold fake antimalarials, consistent with consumers having some ability to infer quality. If no inference of drug quality was possible, beliefs would have been the same across treatment and control villages. Moreover, we find that the NGO entry increased consumption of ACT drugs acquired from all sources by about 30%, i.e. greater market size, and there was a small but statistically insignificant increase on ACT acquired from incumbent drug stores. This is consistent with the counteracting forces approximately canceling each other out.

Appendix Figure C.1 provides a snap shot of the structure of the empirical investigation by showing the main outcomes that will be examined across treatment and control villages.
Our empirical evidence speaks to a rich theoretical literature which investigates the nexus of unobservable quality, price, and competition (Dranove and Satterthwaite, 1992; Mailath and Samuelson, 2001; Metrick and Zeckhauser, 1998; Milgrom and Roberts, 1986; Shapiro, 1982 and 1983; Tirole, 1996; Wolinsky, 1983). Our model is designed to capture the potential mechanisms of the context at hand, including the exogenous introduction of an NGO in a developing country setting. A key assumption here is that the NGO never provides low-quality drugs even if this were profitable to do, while the existing literature largely has focused on markets with profit maximizing firms. The empirical results are consistent with our simple model where the presence of an NGO, as opposed to an average firm, strengthens reputational incentives for competing firms to improve quality in order to not be forced out of the market, leading to ‘good driving out bad’. That said, we cannot entirely rule out that the empirical results found in this paper can also be explained by alternative models and mechanisms.

Our paper adds evidence to the ongoing discussion on regulatory policies that have been put forward to address the problem of fake drugs. The starting point for these initiatives is the lack of enforcement of regulations to safeguard public health: in particular, there is little control of the quality, safety and efficacy of medicines circulating in the market (see e.g. Lancet, 2012). While strengthening the regulatory framework or increasing monitoring might be the first-best solution, such reforms are not easily implemented in the short run in countries with weak institutions, and would be highly costly. Our findings point to several complementary approaches.

First, we find that consumers can identify quality improvements in the market even when the learning environment is noisy. If that was not the case, there would be no pecuniary incentives to build up and maintain a high-quality reputation in weakly regulated and unmonitored markets. These incentives may not be strong enough for the small and informal drug stores that currently dominate the market. Our findings suggest that policies to facilitate the entry of larger firms, or a market chain committed to selling only high quality drugs (similar to the NGO in our case), may be an option to improve drug quality even when firms are not intrinsically motivated to sell high-quality products. This policy suggestion is confirmed by the findings from Bennett and Yin’s (2019) study in India where the entry of a market chain improved drug quality in the local market.

Second, the NGO intervention we exploit in the paper is, in itself, a promising approach. Their franchised direct selling (business-in-a-bag) business has grown rapidly and is currently active in close to 1,000 villages, with a total population of 1.4 million, and continues to expand. An evaluation of their business program also shows promising effects, including a large reduction in under-five mortality (Björkman Nyqvist, Guariso,
Svensson, and Yanagizawa-Drott, 2019). While the NGO intervention likely had an impact on child health through a variety of channels, the direct effect through the supply of authentic ACTs, and the indirect effect through the changed market equilibrium, are likely contributing factors. We discuss additional policy alternatives in our concluding remarks.

This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes important features common to antimalarial markets in sub-Saharan Africa. Section 3 presents a simple two-period model to highlight possible mechanisms. Section 4 describes the data and the empirical design. Section 5 presents the empirical findings. Section 6 concludes.

2 Background: The Market for Antimalarial Drugs

Below we describe some key aspects of the market for antimalarial drugs in developing countries in general, as well as in Uganda in particular. These factors are incorporated in the stylized model we present in the next section.

Disease Burden and Diagnostics. In Africa alone, there were an estimated 215 million cases of malaria in 2019 and roughly 384,000 deaths (WHO, 2020). Children under the age of five account for the majority of the deaths. Uganda, the country in focus for this study, has the world’s highest malaria incidence, with a rate of 201 cases per 1,000 individuals per year (Murray et al., 2012). Malaria is a curable disease if it is promptly treated, but severe malaria can develop from seemingly uncomplicated to untreated cases within hours (Getahun et al., 2010). Artemisinin-based combination therapy (ACT) is currently recommended by the WHO as the first-line treatment of Plasmodium falciparum malaria (the most common type of malaria in sub-Saharan Africa). Multiple brands of ACTs exist, and the retail price for a dose in sub-Saharan Africa is typically around 3-8 USD.

In most of Africa, in particular rural poorer areas, treatment of malaria is largely done at home using traditional remedies or drugs bought from local drug stores. WHO (2011a), estimates that 72% of those who seek treatment for febrile children in Africa seek treatment from private providers, with informal and unregulated private outlets being the most common.\textsuperscript{8, 9}

\textsuperscript{8}Studies on health-seeking behavior document similar patterns. Rutebemberwa et al. (2009) find that two-thirds of febrile children in a predominantly rural area in the Eastern region of Uganda were treated at home with drugs from informal drug shops and private clinics.

\textsuperscript{9}Using data from a representative sample of primary health clinics in Tanzania, Bold et al. (2011) find that 22% of the clinics did not have any ACTs in stock. Björkman and Svensson (2009) show that public dispensaries in rural Uganda were out of stock of drugs in 6 out of 12 months in 2005.
In most cases, the diagnosis is made by the patient or caregiver themselves without any professional assistance or without any formal diagnostic testing.\textsuperscript{10} Symptomatic diagnosis is the norm which can be highly misleading since many infectious diseases mimic malaria both in initial symptoms and in signs of severe illness\textsuperscript{11,12,13}

**Prevalence of Low-Quality Drugs.** By failing to reduce the parasite load or delaying treatment with high quality medicines, poor quality ACTs are a major health concern. Estimates indicate that approximately 0.25 million deaths per year would be preventable if episodes treated with counterfeit and substandard antimalarial drugs were instead treated with high-quality drugs (Harris et al., 2009). Moreover, beyond these direct short-term effects, poor-quality drugs containing sub-therapeutic levels active ingredients can also lead to the development of artemisinin resistance (WHO, 2011b), in addition to long-run adverse effects on both children and adults.\textsuperscript{14}

ACT drugs have been viewed as a prime suspect for counterfeiting since artemisinin is significantly more expensive to produce compared to older, synthetic forms of malaria medicine.\textsuperscript{15} A meta-analysis of surveys from 21 countries in sub-Saharan Africa and seven countries in Southeast Asia estimates that 32 of tested samples failed quality tests and the problem is growing over time (Nayyar et al., 2012; Newton et al., 2011).\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{10}Amexo et al. (2004) report that over 70% of malaria cases in Africa are diagnosed at home.

\textsuperscript{11}Misdiagnosis of malaria has also been shown to hamper social learning about the effectiveness of antimalarials (Adhvaryu, 2014).

\textsuperscript{12}Reyburn et al. (2004), for example, find that more than half of the patients receiving treatment for malaria at government hospitals in Tanzania were not actually infected, and Cohen et al. (2015) show that only 38% of adults who seek treatment for malaria at drug stores in Kenya actually have malaria.

\textsuperscript{13}The high rate of malaria misdiagnosis and over-prescription of antimalarial treatment is driven by four factors. First, blood slide microscopy, considered to be the gold standard for malaria diagnosis in laboratory situations, is either not available or not used. Second, even when blood slide microscopy is available, it often has low accuracy in the field due to poorly maintained equipment, low supply of good-quality reagents, and lack of experienced and trained lab technicians (Amexo et al., 2004; Zurovac et al., 2006). Third, rapid diagnostic tests (RDTs), which have been shown to be highly accurate and can be performed by non-clinical staff or patients themselves, are either not available or too expensive for consumers to demand and use, particularly in rural areas (Cohen et al., 2015). Fourth, compliance with test results, both by individuals and health practitioners, is weak (Juma and Zurovac, 2011).

\textsuperscript{14}A 2006 systematic review of 18 studies concluded that untreated or inadequately treated *plasmodium falciparum* malaria during childhood affects short- and long-term neurocognitive performance (Kihara et al., 2006), and that through a higher risk of anemia, it also adversely impacts cognitive development (Shi et al., 1996). Recent estimates, based on quasi-experimental methods, also suggest a positive effect of malaria reduction on income and human capital attainment (Barecca, 2010; Barofsky et. al., 2011; Bleakley, 2010; Cutler et. al., 2010).

\textsuperscript{15}Bate (2011) estimates that the manufacturer cost, including packaging and distribution, of a counterfeit antimalarial (i.e., a drug that has been deliberately and fraudulently mislabeled with respect to identity and/or source) is about 10% that of an authentic drug. Decreasing costs can be achieved by using lower quality ingredients, under-dosing ingredients, cutting the processing time, or lowering hygiene controls.

\textsuperscript{16}Counterfeit and substandard quality is, however, not a problem specific to antimalarial drugs. The WHO estimates that annual earnings from substandard and counterfeit drugs were US$32 billion in 2003.
quality test effectively means that the drug sample did not contain the ingredients that it should contain according to the authentic standard. There are multiple underlying reasons, intentional to unintentional, that could lead to such quality deterioration along the supply chain. For this reason, the WHO has proposed the term Substandard/Spurious/Falsely-Labelled/Falsified/Counterfeit medical products (SSFFC). For simplicity, we use the term ‘fake’ synonymously with SSFFC and low quality.

As the term SSFFC suggests, low-quality drugs at the end of the supply chain can arise in a myriad of ways. For example, the seller can buy pre-packaged counterfeit or substandard ACTs from either the counterfeiter or from wholesalers involved in the distribution of fake drugs. Anecdotal evidence also suggests that repackaging of non-ACTs into ACT blister packages or ACT packs takes place in-country. The seller can also mix non-ACT drugs or poor-quality ACTs into ACT packages in the store. Drugs that are stored or transported under non-ideal conditions in terms of temperature or humidity may also deteriorate.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to pinpoint exactly how the low-quality drugs end up in the retail stores, but our model will assume that the stores have some degree of control over what quality to supply and higher quality is sourced at higher costs.

Observability and Beliefs about Drug Quality. If antimalarial drugs are experience or credence goods, quality cannot be perfectly observed before purchase. In reality, even if consumers are aware of the existence of fake drugs (26% of the households in our baseline sample report that they think the closest drug store sells fake drugs), it may be very difficult to disentangle the difference between authentic and fake ACT drugs. First, the quality of an ACT drug is difficult to distinguish based on visual characteristics alone, as illustrated in Figure 1, which shows two samples of ACTs packs and blister packages purchased by our covert shopper and tested, one fake and one authentic. Newton et al. (2011) conduct a blind study of the physical appearance and text on the packaging of counterfeit and substandard antimalarials from eight sub-Saharan African countries and the authors conclude that the packaging of counterfeit drugs is similar to that of genuine samples. In our data (described in detail in Section 4), many households report that they distrust the private drug shops. Those with greater distrust tend to acquire medicines from public outlets instead, consistent with demand being a function of expected quality. Moreover, in villages where actual quality in private shops is higher, relatively more
households report they expect higher quality. This suggests that some noisy learning of quality is present in this context, even though quality is not observable before purchase.\textsuperscript{18}

**The Market Structure in Uganda.** The formal structure of the pharmacy and drug store market in Uganda requires pharmacies and drug stores to have official licenses to purchase and distribute drugs.\textsuperscript{19} All drugs imported and sold must be approved by the National Drug Authority (NDA) and are included on the Essential Medicine List Uganda (EMLU). The NDA is supposed to monitor the agents in the pharmaceutical sector through inspections and quality tests of the drugs although no information is available on the passing rate for the drug stores. Drug stores are typically small-scale businesses located in rural areas without a formal pharmacist. They purchase their medicines and health supplies from importers and distributors, wholesale and retail pharmacies, as well as from local pharmaceutical manufacturers. By law, the drug stores are restricted to a small list of medicines and health supplies but commonly stock and sell medicines beyond what they are licensed to.

Despite the formal market regulations, private sector providers in sub-Saharan Africa are mostly unlicensed, often diagnose illnesses incorrectly, and sell truncated doses of medicines as well as expired drugs also not recommended by national guidelines (Buchner, 2011; Trelevan et al., 2015). The Ugandan medical drug market is no exception and evidence shows that it is characterized by weak enforcement of laws and regulations. Buchner et al. (2019) studied the lack of enforcement to regulations in Uganda by investigating the licensing status and characteristics of large set of drug stores in rural Uganda, finding that of the 215 drug stores surveyed, 88% were either unlicensed or license status was unknown to the owner. On the day of survey, 42% of the drug stores were closed. In terms of length of operation, 65% had operated for more than one year and 11% were newly opened (all without licenses). The setting for our study largely mimics that describe by Buchner et al. (2019). 71% of the drug stores in our control group were open on the survey day and had ACT drugs in stock, and 11% had permanently or temporarily closed since baseline.

In theory, drugs in Uganda are provided for free in public health centers and hospitals. However, in practice, the public health system is largely unreliable due to issues with procurement or stockouts. (Economic Policy Research Centre, 2010). This gives the private drug outlets in Uganda a major role in selling essential medicines. Baseline survey data from our control villages show that 54% of households typically acquire their ACT drugs from private drug outlets (shops or clinics), 45% from public providers (health centers

\textsuperscript{18}See Appendix Figure C.7 for these patterns.
\textsuperscript{19}Information from the Uganda Ministry of Health and National Drug Authority.
or clinics) and 1% from other sources (e.g., NGOs). The most common ACT medicine in our baseline sample is Lonart which two thirds of all drug stores sold, followed by Artefan which roughly one fourth of the stores sold. Both of these are generic versions of Coartem. A few stores sold Coartem and Lumartem. Because generic drugs dominate in this setting, this helps rule out the possibility that counterfeiters are packaging and selling drugs as the more expensive Coartem but where the content is a generic drug of the same active ingredient. There are on average only 1.2 drugs stores per village; this implies that there is little variation in ACT supply within villages as well. The price per dose is roughly 4.5 USD but ranges from 3 to 8 USD. The difference in price between the different brands is only roughly 1.4 USD.

The market in rural areas is characterized by relatively low competition, with 26% of local markets (villages) served by a local monopoly. In general, variation in price across villages would arise due to differential costs and demand structures. While such factors are unobservable to us in the data, there is spatial correlation in price differences as a function of distance between shops, as we would expect when costs and demand conditions are more similar in nearby villages. Within villages, differences may be driven by heterogeneity in shop or owner conditions, or beliefs about quality among customers. That said, price differences within villages are much smaller than across villages, typically less than 20%.\textsuperscript{20} Interestingly, while we see strong spatial correlations in prices, data from our control villages suggest that competition (number of private drug shops per village) does not seem strongly related to price, or beliefs about quality in our setting.\textsuperscript{21}

We further discuss the role of competition, theoretically and empirically, in what will follow.

\section{Conceptual Framework}

In this section we provide a stylized model which takes into account some of the key aspects of the market described in the previous section. To keep things simple, it will be a two-period model focusing on the behavior of incumbent drug stores and households in response to the entry of a seller (the NGO) committed to selling high-quality drugs. The main goal is to derive predictions and insights that can be taken to the data. This section ends with a discussion on a set of modelling counterfactuals.

\textsuperscript{20}See Appendix Figure C.5 and C.6.
\textsuperscript{21}See Appendix Figure C.8.
3.1 The market for fake drugs

The economy is populated by consumers of antimalarial drugs, of unit mass, and two types of potential sellers of antimalarial drugs: an honest type denoted with superscript $H$ and an opportunistic type denoted with superscript $O$. There are two periods, denoted with subscript $t$. We start by considering the case where there is only one seller in the market. An honest seller only supplies high-quality antimalarial drugs and sets prices to maximize profit, while an opportunistic type can also sell low-quality drugs; i.e., an opportunistic type sets both prices and quality to maximize profit.\(^{22}\)

The seller’s type is not observable by the buyers (consumers). Consumers know, however, the two types’ preferences.

In each period consumers fall sick with malaria or some other fever-causing illness; some of the non-malarial causes of fever resolve without alternate intervention, and some do not. Consumers do not know the exact cause of their fever as they lack the ability to diagnose it. This means that at the market level, every village would have three potential categories of febrile individuals – a share $\alpha_m$ with malaria, a share $\alpha_r$ with a non-malarial illness that will resolve on its own, and a share $\alpha_n$ with a non-malarial illness caused by something that needs alternate (non-malarial) treatment. These shares, in turn, are functions of the disease state $d$. Specifically we assume there are two possible disease states, $H$ and $L$, with $H$ occurring with probability $\theta$. Intuitively we can think of $H$ as a disease environment with relatively high incidence of malaria; i.e., $\alpha_m(H) > \alpha_m(L)$.

The quality of the antimalarial drug, $q$, sold by the seller can either be high, $\bar{q}$, or low, $q$. The marginal (average) cost of selling low-quality drugs is normalized to 0 and the cost of selling high-quality drugs is $c_H$ for the honest type and $c$ for the opportunistic type, with $c \geq c_H$.\(^{23}\) If the individual suffers from malaria and is treated with a high-quality antimalarial drug, the individual recovers with probability $r(\bar{q})$. If the individual suffers from malaria and is treated with a low-quality antimalarial drug, the individual recovers with probability $r(q)$, with $r(\bar{q}) > r(q)$. The share of individuals that (quickly) recovers after treatment with antimalarial drugs is $\chi_{d,q} = \alpha_m(d)r(q) + \alpha_r(d)$ where $d = \{H, L\}$ and $q = \{\bar{q}, q\}$.

Consumers care about getting well and about the cost of treatment. However, they do not observe the quality of the drugs nor the reason why they suffer from fever. We

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\(^{22}\)This formulation of preferences is standard in reputation models. The presence of an honest type creates incentives for the opportunistic type to build a reputation (see for example Tirole, 1996).

\(^{23}\)Normalizing the cost of selling low quality to 0 reduces the notational complexity of the analysis but has no qualitative implications. Further, and to simplify the analysis, and as the honest type’s choice of quality is mechanic, we only consider differential costs for the opportunistic type.
also assume consumers’ willingness to pay for drugs varies, either because they differ in preferences or in their ability to pay. Specifically, the share of consumers willing to buy antimalarial drugs is given by

\[ s_t = \max \left\{ \frac{\gamma \hat{q}_t - p_t}{\gamma}, 0 \right\} \]

where \( \hat{q}_t \) is the expected quality of the drugs in period \( t \) and \( \gamma \) is a measure of how much consumers value quality.\(^{24}\) We normalize drug quality such that \( \bar{q} = 1 \) and \( q = 0 \). Note that these assumptions imply that all consumers would buy if \( \hat{q}_t = 1 \) and \( p_t = 0 \), and none would buy, assuming \( p_t \geq 0 \), if \( \hat{q}_t = 0 \).

In the beginning of period 1, nature draws the type of seller with the honest type chosen with probability \( \mu \). The seller then sets quality (\( q_1 \)) and price (\( p_1 \)) and consumers decide whether to buy antimalarial drugs given their beliefs and their prior that the seller is an honest type. At the end of the period, consumers receive an imprecise signal, \( z \), about the share of individuals that have (quickly) recovered after treatment; i.e., \( z = z(\chi_{j,q}) \). In period 2, the seller again sets quality (\( q_2 \)) and price (\( p_2 \)), and consumers decide whether to buy antimalarial drugs given their beliefs and their posteriors that the seller is honest.

We make three assumptions:

**Assumption 1:**

(a) \( \gamma \mu \geq c_H \) and \( \gamma > 1 \); (b) \( \theta = \frac{1}{2} \); (c) \( z(\chi_{L,q}) = z(\chi_{H,q}) \).

Assumption 1a ensures that the honest seller’s markup \( (p - c) \) is positive. Assumption 1b is adopted to save on notation. Assumption 1c restricts the number of signals to three and thereby ensures that the signals are not fully revealing the quality of the antimalarial drugs on the market. Note that we do not have to assume that the share of individuals that recover is the same in the two scenarios \( \{q = \bar{q}, d = L\} \) and \( \{q = q, d = H\} \), but that the two (imprecise) signals are the same. Intuitively, we can think of \( z' = z(\chi_{H,q}) \) as signaling that "many individuals recover quickly" (because high prevalence of malaria and high-quality antimalarial drugs in the market), \( z'' = z(\chi_{L,q}) = z(\chi_{H,q}) \) as signaling that "some individuals recover quickly" (because low prevalence of malaria, so the share receiving treatment with authentic antimalarial drugs when in fact they suffer from another illness is likely high, or high prevalence of malaria and some individuals recover

\(^{24}\)We can derive (1) from individual utility maximization in a number of ways depending on the source of the heterogeneity. For example, assume consumers differ in their ability to pay; i.e., their income varies. Assume income \( y^i \) is distributed uniformly over the unit interval. Consumers have unit demands; i.e., they buy at most one unit of the good. Each consumer \( i \) has tastes described by an (expected) conditional utility function of the form \( Eu^i(p) = \frac{1}{\gamma} (\gamma \hat{q} - p) \), if she buys the drug at price \( p \). Consumer \( i \) will buy the drug if \( \gamma \hat{q} - p \geq y^i \), implying that the share of consumers that will buy is \( \frac{\gamma \hat{q} - p}{\gamma} \).
also from treatment with low-quality antimalarial drugs), and \( z''' = z(\chi_L, \varphi) \) as signaling that "few individuals recover quickly" (because few individuals suffer from malaria and the few who do are treated with low-quality drugs).

### 3.1.1 The monopoly case

We solve the problem by working backwards. The solution concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium in pure strategies. Because the honest type behaves mechanistically, the focus of the analysis is on the opportunistic type.

Let \( h_t \) and \( o_t \) denote consumers’ beliefs about the quality chosen by the honest and opportunistic type, respectively, in period \( t \).

Consider period 2. When consumers make their choice of whether to buy drugs or not, they realize that only an honest type will sell high-quality drugs (\( q^H_2 = 1 \)), while an opportunistic type, who does not face any reputational incentives, will set \( q^O_2 = 0 \). Given the prior \( \mu \), Bayesian updating gives the posterior that the incumbent is honest:

\[
\hat{\mu}(z|h_1, o_1) = \Pr[H|z] = \frac{\Pr[H] \Pr[z|H]}{\Pr[H] \Pr[z|H] + \Pr[O] \Pr[z|O]} .
\]

That is

\[
\hat{\mu}(z'|1, 0) = 1; \hat{\mu}(z''|1, 0) = \mu; \hat{\mu}(z'''|1, 0) = 0 ,
\]

and

\[
\hat{\mu}(z'|1, 1) = \mu; \hat{\mu}(z''|1, 1) = \mu; \hat{\mu}(z'''|1, 1) = 0 .
\]

In the last period the honest type will sell high-quality antimalarial drugs and set the price to maximize:

\[
\max_{p_2} E[\pi_2] = E[(p_2 - c_H)s_2] .
\]

From the first order condition we can solve for the honest type’s choice of price, \( p^H_2 \), and expected demand, \( s^H_2 \), as a function of expected period 2 quality, \( \hat{q}_2 \). That is,

\[
p^H_2(\hat{q}_2) = p^*_2(\hat{q}_2) = \frac{\gamma \hat{q}_2 + c_H}{2} ; \quad s^H_2(\hat{q}_2) = s^*_2(\hat{q}_2) = \frac{\gamma \hat{q}_2 - c_H}{2\gamma} ,
\]

where \( \hat{q}_2 = \hat{\mu}h_2 + (1 - \hat{\mu})o_2 \), with the posteriors given in (3)-(4).
Next consider the opportunistic type. Note that an opportunistic seller will be revealed as opportunistic, and thus forced to exit, with probability 1 if $z = z''$. The opportunistic type will also be revealed as opportunistic, given consumers’ beliefs, if setting a price that differs from that of the honest type. Consider the case when $z = z'$ or $z = z''$. Given consumers’ beliefs, the opportunistic type will set $p_2^O = p_2^H$. Furthermore, as the seller has no incentive to sell high-quality drugs in the last period, $q_2^O = 0$.

In period 1, when making their initial purchase, consumers base their decisions only on their priors ($\mu$). Expected period 1 quality is then simply $\hat{q}_1 = \mu h_1 + (1 - \mu) o_1$.

The honest type again sells high-quality drugs and sets the price to maximize

$$\max_{p_1} E [\pi_1] = (p_1 - c_H)s_1 + \delta \pi_2^H,$$

where $\delta$ is the discount factor and where $\pi_2^H$ is expected period 2 profit.

From the first-order condition we can again solve for the optimal price (this time as a function of period 1 expected quality), and determine expected demand, $s_1^H (\hat{q}_1)$. That is:

$$p_1^H (\hat{q}_1) = p_1^* (\hat{q}_1) = \frac{\gamma \hat{q}_1 + c_H}{2}; \quad s_1^H (\hat{q}_1) = s_1^* (\hat{q}_1) = \frac{\gamma \hat{q}_1 - c_H}{2\gamma},$$

where $\hat{q}_1 = 1$ if $\{h_1, o_1\} = \{1, 1\}$ and $\hat{q}_1 = \mu$ if $\{h_1, o_1\} = \{1, 0\}$.

As in period 2, the opportunistic type will mimic the honest type in terms of price setting behavior; i.e., $p_1^O = p_1^H$. Let $\pi^O (q_1^O, q_2^O \mid h_1, h_2 \{o_1, o_2\})$ denote total expected profit as a function of drug quality and beliefs in the two periods. There are two possible pure-strategy equilibria to consider. The opportunistic type can set low quality in both periods or high quality in period 1 and low quality in period 2.

Consider first the equilibrium in which $\{q_1^H, q_2^H\} = \{h_1, h_2\} = \{1, 1\}$ and $\{q_1^O, q_2^O\} = \{o_1, o_2\} = \{0, 0\}$. This is an equilibrium if no deviation, given beliefs, yields higher profit; i.e., if deviating and playing $q_1^O = 1$ is unprofitable and beliefs are consistent with equilibrium play. That is, if

$$\pi^O (0, 0 \mid \{1, 1\} \{0, 0\}) > \pi^O (1, 0 \mid \{1, 1\} \{0, 0\}).$$

Inserting the expressions for price and demand from (6) and (8), condition (9) reduces to (see online Appendix A for details)

$$cs_1^* (\mu) > \delta \frac{p_2^* (1)}{2} s_2^* (1).$$

The left hand side of (10) is the total (additional) cost incurred if the opportunistic seller
deviates and sells high-quality drugs in the first period. The right hand side of (10) is the expected discounted gain in period 2 profits from selling high-quality drugs in period 1. When deviating and selling high quality in the first period, \( z = z' \) with probability 1/2 and consumers, given their beliefs, expect the (opportunistic) seller to be an honest type. Given beliefs, selling low quality in period 1 is profitable if the additional cost of selling high-quality drugs in the first period outweighs the gain of higher expected discounted profits in period 2. Note that condition (10) holds if the marginal cost of supplying high-quality drugs is sufficiently high; i.e., if \( c > \bar{c} \equiv \frac{\delta p_2^*(1) s_2^*(1)}{2s_1^*(\mu)} \).

Next consider the equilibrium in which \( q_1^H, q_2^H = h_1, h_2 \) and \( q_1^O, q_2^O = o_1, o_2 \). This is an equilibrium if deviating and playing \( q_1^O = 0 \) is unprofitable, given beliefs. That is, if

\[
\pi^O(1,0) > \pi^O(0,0) \quad \text{if} \quad \pi^O(1,0) > \pi^O(0,0) .
\]

Inserting the expressions for price and demand from (6) and (8), condition (11) can be written as

\[
(c^*)_s_1^H(1) < \frac{\delta}{2} p_2^*(\mu) s_2^*(\mu) .
\]

The left hand side of (12) is the reduction in cost from deviating, \( cs_1^H(1) \). The right hand side of (12) is the expected loss of no longer remaining in the market with certainty; deviating and selling low quality implies that, with probability 1/2, \( z = z''' \) and consumers will infer that the seller is an opportunistic type. Note that condition (12) will hold if the marginal cost, \( c \), of supplying high-quality drugs is sufficiently low; i.e., if \( c < \bar{c} \equiv \frac{\delta p_2^*(\mu) s_2^*(\mu)}{2s_1^*(\mu)} \). We now summarize the results presented so far.

**Proposition 1**: (A) If \( c > \bar{c} \) there is a unique equilibrium (perfect Bayesian equilibrium in pure strategies) in which the honest type sells high-quality drugs and the opportunistic type sells low-quality drugs and remains in the market with probability \( \theta \). Both types of sellers set the same price in each period. (B) If \( c = c_H \), then provided that \( \mu > \sqrt{\delta - \frac{1}{4}\delta^2} \), such an equilibrium continues to exist if \( c_H \in \left( -\frac{4\gamma_1\mu + \sqrt{\Delta}}{2(\delta - 4)}, -\frac{4\gamma_1\mu - \sqrt{\Delta}}{2(\delta - 4)} \right) \), where \( \Delta = 4\gamma_2^2 \left( 4\mu^2 + \delta^2 - 4\delta \right) \). (C) If \( c < \bar{c} \) there exists a unique equilibrium in which both types sell high-quality drugs in period 1 and the opportunistic type sells low-quality drugs in period 2. In both periods the two types set the same price.

These results are intuitive. The drug stores set price, which is observable, and quality, which is not. An opportunistic type wants to be perceived as an honest type. For observable variables such as the price, the opportunistic type therefore mimics the honest type’s
choices. For unobservable variables such as quality, the opportunistic seller weighs the gain of mimicking the honest type - higher future expected demand - with the cost of selling high quality. If the cost is sufficiently high, the profit maximizing strategy calls for selling low-quality drugs in both periods, even if there is then a risk that the seller will be revealed as opportunistic and forced to exit the market.

### 3.1.2 NGO in the market

Consider next the case where there are two sellers, denoted by superscript $S$, on the market of which one is committed to selling high-quality antimalarial drugs. That is, the second seller is assumed to be an honest type. Given the empirical setting we are considering, we label the second seller the NGO ($S = N$) and the first seller the incumbent ($S = I$).

The entry of a new seller committed to high quality raises a number of issues, including how firms compete and how beliefs about the NGO are formed. We disregard most of these issues here and simply assume that the two sellers are perceived as being identical in period 1, that is, consumers believe the incumbent and the NGO can have either honest or opportunistic preferences. Furthermore, and again motivated by the empirical setting, we assume that consumers believe that an honest seller either set the price $p^*$ or a price $p^N < p^*$, where $p^*$ is the monopoly price and $p^N = p^∗(1 - ω)$, with $ω$ being the subsidy rate. We also assume the incumbent can observe the NGO’s type (and vice versa).

With two sellers in the market consumers receive two signals, $z^N$ and $z^I$. We assume, as seems plausible in a small village market, that the disease state is village specific, such that all consumers in the village face the same disease state (the same malaria prevalence). This assumption provides the basis for the next proposition.

**Proposition 2:** If the disease state is village specific, consumers will be able to distinguish the quality choices of the two sellers if sellers choose to sell drugs of different quality.

To solve for the equilibrium, note as before that an opportunistic seller will always mimic the honest seller with respect to observable outcomes (prices). Thus, if $\hat{q}_I^t = \hat{q}_N^t = \hat{q}_t$, and the (honest) NGO sets the price $p^N$, the price set by the incumbent and share of consumers that buys from the incumbent are

\[ p_I^t(\hat{q}_t) = (1 - ω) p^*(\hat{q}_t), \]

\[ 25 \text{In the experiment we discuss below, the NGO branded itself as a high-quality seller by using the brand name of the funding organization. It also entered the market selling antimalarial pills below the prevailing market price.} \]
and

\begin{equation}
    s^I_t (\hat{q}_t) = \frac{1}{2} \gamma \hat{q}_t - (1 - \omega) p^* (\hat{q}_t),
\end{equation}

where we have assumed that the NGO and the incumbent split the demand equally when both set the same price and are perceived as selling drugs of the same expected quality. \(p^* (\hat{q}_t)\) is defined in (6) and (8).

Bayesian updating, with two signals, gives the posterior, \(\hat{\mu} (z^N, z^I | h^S_1, o^S_1)\), that both the incumbent and the NGO are honest types,

\begin{equation}
    \hat{\mu} (z', z' | 1, 0) = \hat{\mu}; \hat{\mu} (z'', z'' | 1, 1) = \hat{\mu},
\end{equation}

where \(h^I_t = h^N_t\) and \(o^I_t = o^N_t\) by the assumed symmetry, and where \(\hat{\mu} \equiv \frac{\mu^2}{\mu^2 + (1 - \mu)^2}\). Note from proposition 2 that the types are fully revealed if \(q^I_t = q^N_t\), since then \(z^I = z^N\).

Let \(\pi^I (q^I_1, q^I_2 | \{1, 1\} \{1, 0\})\) denote total expected profit as a function of drug quality and beliefs in the two periods. With the (honest) NGO on the market, and with correlated signals, an opportunistic incumbent’s quality choice depends on the gain (profit) of remaining in the market in the next period, which now only occurs if \(q^I_1 = 1\), relative to the short run costs of selling high-quality drugs in the first period. That is, mimicking the NGO in the first period is an equilibrium if,

\begin{equation}
    \pi^I (1, 0 | \{1, 1\} \{1, 0\}) > \pi^I (0, 0 | \{1, 1\} \{1, 0\}),
\end{equation}

which, by substituting (13) and (14) into (15), simplifies to,

\begin{equation}
    c < \bar{c} (\omega) \equiv \frac{\delta (1 - \omega) p^* (\hat{\mu}) s^I_1 (\hat{\mu})}{s^I_1 (1)}.\n\end{equation}

Maximizing short run profits by selling low-quality drugs in the first period is an equilibrium if

\begin{equation}
    \pi^I (0, 0 | \{1, 1\} \{0, 0\}) > \pi^I (1, 0 | \{1, 1\} \{1, 0\}).
\end{equation}

That is if

\begin{equation}
    c > \bar{c} (\omega) \equiv \frac{\delta (1 - \omega) [p^* (\hat{\mu}) s^I_2 (\hat{\mu}) + p^* (1) s^I_2 (1)]}{2 s^I_1 (\mu)}.
\end{equation}

Below we summarize the results (see online Appendix A for further details).
Proposition 3: There exists a parameter space such that \( \bar{c} < \zeta(\omega) \). For these parameter values, an opportunistic incumbent facing marginal cost \( c \in (\bar{c}, \zeta(\omega)) \) sells low-quality drugs in both periods and charges price \( p^* \) in the monopoly case, but sells high-quality drugs in period 1 at price \( p^N \) when facing competition from an honest NGO. An opportunistic incumbent facing marginal cost \( c > \bar{c}(\omega) \) sells low-quality drugs in both periods at price \( p^* \) in the monopoly case, and sells low-quality drugs in period 1 at price \( p^N \) and exits the market after one period when facing competition from an honest NGO.\(^{26}\)

We now summarize the main implications of the model.\(^{27}\) If the cost of providing high-quality drugs is sufficiently high, the equilibrium with only one seller on the market will be characterized by low quality (Proposition 1). That is, the cost of authentic drugs is a crucial determinant of whether low-quality drugs are sold. Despite selling low-quality drugs, sellers will attract demand since a consumer cannot perfectly tell whether her subsequent health outcome is due to treatment of high-quality antimalarial drugs, or because she suffered from a non-malarial illness that resolved on its own. The equilibrium price is a positive function of expected quality, but since firms pool on the same price within a (village) market, firms selling different quality drugs will charge the same price (Proposition 1). With the NGO on the market, consumers’ ability to learn about quality improves (Proposition 2), because the learning environment improves; i.e., consumers will be able to distinguish the quality choices of the two sellers if sellers choose to sell drugs of different quality. When facing competition from the NGO selling high-quality drugs at a subsidized price, opportunistic incumbents will either sell high quality (low cost types) or exit (high cost types) after the first period (Proposition 3). That is, the cost of acquiring authentic drugs determines how the incumbent responds to the entry of the NGO. Exit is more likely to occur the lower the price charged by the NGO. The market price for antimalarial drugs will decrease because drug stores will pool on the subsidized price offered by the NGO. The reputation among incumbents who remain in the market will increase as households, correctly, expect the drug quality to increase (as compared to the average monopoly outcome). As expected quality increases when the NGO enters – because (i) the NGO sells high-quality drugs by assumption, (ii) incumbents selling low quality will be forced to exit, and (iii) incumbents remaining in the market will sell high-quality drugs in period 1 – and as prices fall, the overall market size (quantity consumed from

\(^{26}\)As shown in online Appendix A, \( \zeta(\omega) \leq \bar{c}(\omega) \). A sufficient condition for \( \zeta(\omega) > \bar{c} \) is that \( \mu \) is sufficiently large. If \( \zeta(\omega) < \bar{c} \), the opportunistic type sells high quality in period 1 in both the monopoly case and when facing competition from the honest NGO. That is, in this scenario the intervention should not have an impact on average quality on the market. For \( c \in (\zeta(\omega), \bar{c}(\omega)) \), there exists no pure strategy equilibrium.

\(^{27}\)As outcomes vary across types, disease states, and time periods, we here summarize predicted outcomes averaging across types, disease states, and time periods.
all sources) will increase. The quantity consumed from incumbents who remain in the market is indeterminate.

3.2 Modelling Counterfactuals

To provide nuance, in this section we will briefly discuss a few modelling counterfactuals that relate to external validity.

What if the NGO had sold at a different price?
The model suggests that the effect on incumbent exits depends on the price set by the NGO. In the data, we have no experimental variation in prices.\textsuperscript{28} Thus, we cannot assess empirically how outcomes would change as a function of the price set by the NGO. Instead, we capture the average effect given the price set by the NGO. It is unclear whether one should expect the exit effect to be big or small in this setting.

That said, we can use our stylized model to discuss this counterfactual case. To illustrate the equilibrium, assume there is a large set of markets, each with an opportunistic incumbent. In each market, the incumbent draws a cost $c$ from an uniform distribution over $[\bar{c}, c']$ with $c' > \bar{c}(0)$, and competes with an honest NGO. Appendix Figure C.2, Panel A, plots the equilibrium choices as a function of $c$ when $\omega = 0$ while Panel B plots the equilibrium choices when $\omega > 0$; i.e., when antimalarial drugs are subsidized by the NGO. Opportunistic incumbents with relatively low costs of supplying high-quality medicine, (such that $c < \zeta(\omega)$), will sell low quality in the monopoly case but high quality in the first period when competing with an (honest) NGO. Opportunistic incumbents with relatively high costs of supplying high-quality medicine; i.e. with a $c > \bar{c}(\omega)$, will sell low-quality medicine both in the monopoly case and when facing competition from an honest NGO, but will be forced to exit after one period in the second scenario.\textsuperscript{29} Independent of cost structure, an opportunistic incumbent will set the same price as the honest NGO. A higher subsidy (higher $\omega$) lowers the return to building a reputation (mimicking the NGO) as expected future profits fall. As a result, the threshold costs $\zeta(\omega)$ and $\bar{c}(\omega)$ fall, with a lower share of firms switching from selling low quality (under monopoly) to high quality (when competing with an honest NGO), and a higher share of firms exiting the market when competing with an honest NGO (Panel B).

In sum, this analysis suggests that the exact price of the NGO does not have a first order effect on quality among incumbents (in period 1). Rather, it influences which mech-

\textsuperscript{28}In our setting the NGO sold authentic ACT drugs at a price 20%-30% below the prevailing market price.

\textsuperscript{29}For opportunistic types with $\zeta(\omega) \leq c \leq \bar{c}(\omega)$, there exists no pure strategy equilibrium.
anisms drive equilibrium quality – whether the extensive or intensive margin effect dominates – in addition to the direct effects on prices and quantity demanded.

**What if the entrant was not a NGO?**
The model suggests that the effect on quality is different if a profit-maximizing (opportunistic) incumbent enters instead of an (honest) NGO. Here we again have no experimental variation to take to the data since the entrant in this empirical study is a nonprofit firm. However, we can use our stylized two-period model to discuss potential outcomes. Specifically, we can compare how the equilibrium would change if the opportunistic incumbent faces competition from either an opportunistic entrant or an honest for-profit entrant. To do so, however, we first need to determine how prices are set by profit-maximizing firms. Note, that if two honest types compete, given the assumption that honest types always sell high-quality drugs, they compete only in prices. The Nash equilibrium of such a Bertrand game has both sellers setting \( p = c_H \). If we assume that consumers face small search costs, the unique equilibrium has both firms setting \( p = p^* \) as in the Diamond paradox (Diamond, 1971).  

With search costs, and with an honest for-profit entrant, the equilibrium is identical to that described in Proposition 3 with \( \omega = 0 \). If the entrant is an opportunistic type, both the entrant and the incumbent will set \( p = p^* \).

As shown in Appendix A, if \( c < c(0) \), the equilibrium has both sellers selling high quality in period 1 and low quality in period 2. If \( c > \bar{c}' > c(0) \), on the other hand, the equilibrium has both sellers selling low quality in period 1. Both sellers remain in the market in period 2 with probability \( \theta \) and continue to sell low quality.

In other words, the model suggests that the fact that the NGO was an honest seller committed to authentic drugs is key for the effect on quality among incumbents, as we would not expect the same strong effect had a random profit-maximizing firm entered. The underlying reason why competition per se may not solve the quality problem is that quality is unobservable. As such, two competing sellers, while competing on prices, can both get away by selling lower quality drugs. When both do so, the learning environment may not improve much compared to the monopoly situation. While each seller has an incentive to raise quality so as to push their competitor out of the market, if the costs of selling low-quality drugs (relative to high-quality drugs) is sufficiently small, the profit

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\(^{30}\)With small search costs we could, in the limit, also rationalize the assumption that the for-profit honest types set either \( p = p^* \) or \( p = p^N \). To see this assume an honest NGO sets \( p = p^N \). Assume further that consumers expect sellers to set the same price, \( p = p^N \), and start out at one store at random, observing the price in that store only. Consumer can search the other stores at some cost. Assume that cost is small such that consumers search for the price in the other store if \( p > p^N \). Consider next the honest for-profit firm. Deviating and setting a price \( p < p^N \) will increase demand, but only from existing consumers, and as a result profits will fall. Increasing the price will lead consumers to search for the NGO’s price and, as a result, that all consumers will buy from the NGO.
maximizing strategy may still be to continue selling low quality.

What if drug stores cannot perfectly observe their own quality?
In the model the incumbents know, or can control, their own quality. In reality it is possible that they face some uncertainty about the quality they purchase from wholesalers. When the NGO enters, it could then be the case that drug stores that unknowingly sell low-quality ACT medicines are pushed out of the market. Wholesalers can be found throughout the country, both licensed (government approved and in theory monitored) and unlicensed (rogue sellers without government monitoring). Anecdotally, there are wholesalers with better and worse reputation, and in general the view is that the best quality can be found by going straight to the licensed wholesalers in the capital of Kampala. The lowest reputation are the unlicensed wholesalers that pass through villages on motorbikes selling drugs to shops. We do not have data on wholesaler interactions so ultimately we cannot provide evidence on this mechanism. It is an avenue for future research.

In light of this, what seems key is the ability for retailers to be able to infer quality across wholesalers but how would they do that? It seems reasonable they should be able to better infer quality if they switch providers from time to time. Even if they are initially completely naive about their own quality when selling drugs acquired from a given wholesaler, if consumers complain whenever the drugs don’t seem to work (even though they may be wrong sometimes because they did not have malaria to begin with), over time they will have many data points to form beliefs about quality on. If they switch providers, and consumers do not complain as much anymore, they would infer that quality is better. At that point, they have a menu of expected wholesaler quality-price options to choose from. That is where our model comes in.

The model could be extended, or reinterpreted, to take this alternative mechanism into account by having wholesalers determining quality and retailers only setting prices. In this version, there would be two types of wholesalers (honest and opportunistic) that can provide retailers with drugs of some quality. Consumers, and retailers, would then update beliefs about the type of wholesaler, conditional on observing the share of people that recovered quickly. The mechanism, through which bad-quality drugs are driven out of the market would, in this alternative version, be very similar to the present model. While it may not matter for household members seeking treatment for malaria whether retailers or wholesalers are cheating, it is still an important issue for further research to understand exactly how cheating or negligence arises in the supply chain.\footnote{There may be additional alternative interpretations of our main findings. In the model, the NGO in-}
4 Design, Data, and Measurement

4.1 Design

We combine two rounds of household survey data from the pilot phase of an impact evaluation of a market-based community health care program in Uganda (Björkman Nyqvist, Guariso, Svensson, and Yanagizawa-Drott, 2019) with a cross-sectional dataset on drug quality collected at follow-up.

For the drug quality study we use data from four districts (Bushenji, Mbale, Mbarara, and Mpigi) characterized by high and endemic \( P. falciparum \) malaria prevalence (Figure 2). In each district, an NGO (Living Goods, or their collaborating partner BRAC) operates a market-based community health care program.\(^{32}\) In total, there were 99 project villages in the four selected districts. For the experimental design, the villages were stratified by location (district) and population size, thus creating matched blocks with similar characteristics. From each block, half of the villages were then randomly assigned to the intervention group (49 villages) and the remaining villages (50 villages) were assigned to the control group.

Once the treatment status was assigned, the collaborating NGOs recruited and trained a woman in each village to act as the sales agent for Living Goods and BRAC. The saleswomen work under an implicit piece-rate scheme. They purchase authentic ACT antimalarials from the NGO at a wholesale price about 40% below the market price. The NGO, however, sets the retail price with a target of keeping it approximately 20%-30% lower than the prevailing local market price. The saleswomen keep the difference.

The saleswomen are expected to sell ACTs to households only in the village to which they were assigned. In the event that some sales were also made outside of the assigned

directly improves learning by helping households sort out village-level health/disease shocks, making it more difficult for retailers to get away with selling low quality. An alternative story is that the NGO saleswomen may have educated or directly facilitated households’ ability to better diagnose malaria, or improved households’ ability to draw inferences about drugs after taking them. In Appendix Table C.5 we report treatment effects on knowledge about antimalarial medicines, in particular whether ACTs are more effective than non-ACTs. The point estimates are close to zero and insignificant. Thus, health education does not seem to explain the findings. Another potential mechanism would be that if the NGO directly informed households about the prevalence of fake drugs in the local drug stores, households could put pressure on the drug stores directly to stop selling fake drugs. There is no anecdotal evidence that the saleswomen were involved in such activities.

\(^{32}\)Living Goods is an American NGO with a branch in Uganda. They operate networks of independent entrepreneurs who sell treatment and preventive medicines, as well as other health products, mostly in rural areas. In Uganda they work both independently and in collaboration with BRAC-Uganda. BRAC operates a number of different programs across several developing countries with a focus on poverty alleviation.
villages, our estimates will represent a lower bound on the impact of the market entry.\(^{33}\) Importantly, the NGO carried an ACT brand ("Lumartem") that was not sold in local drug stores during the period of the study. This enables us to rule out mechanical effects on market quality from the saleswomen selling directly to private outlets. The saleswomen also have access to other products they can sell, including hygiene products and other health products (such as deworming pills and painkillers), and are instructed to conduct home visits for sick children, to visit newborns within the first 48 hours of life, and to encourage pregnant women to deliver in a facility or with professional assistance. While it is possible that these additional tasks could have an effect on the quality of ACTs in the marketplace, the sale of hygiene products or deworming pills or home visits of newborn and sick children would likely not have a first-order effect on these outcomes. The saleswomen did not have access to any diagnostic tests for malaria and they did not receive any training about the extent and dangers of fake ACT drugs.

### 4.2 Data

The trial profile is illustrated in Figure 3. A baseline household survey and a census of drug stores were carried out in all 99 project villages at the beginning of 2010. The census verified the physical presence of all drug stores in the project villages but did not include a drug quality survey. In total, 135 drug stores in 57 village markets were identified: 55 drug stores in 26 treatment villages and 80 drug stores in 31 control villages.\(^ {34}\) At the end of 2010, approximately one year after the intervention had begun, the drug quality survey was implemented in all villages. The drug quality survey identified 122 of the 135 stores.\(^ {35}\) Of the 122 stores, 93 stores in 47 villages had ACT medicine in stock at the time of the survey. The sample of outlets with drug quality data thus consists of 93 drug stores in 47 villages, of which 57 stores are located in 27 control villages and 36 stores are located in 20 treatment villages. A follow-up household survey was conducted in the fall of 2011, approximately 18 months into the intervention, in a subset of 48 randomly selected project villages.

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\(^{33}\)In Björkman Nyqvist et al. (2019) we find that 5.4% of the households in the control villages had been visited by a Living Goods saleswomen.

\(^{34}\)The design, with 57 clusters, 2.4 drug stores per cluster, and an intra-cluster correlation coefficient of 0.2, had a 80% power to detect a 0.47 standardized effect at the 0.10 significance level. It had a 60% power to detect a standardized effect size of 0.36.

\(^{35}\)The remaining 13 stores were either permanently or temporarily closed.
4.3 Measurement

The measurement of drug quality had two main components: the purchase of ACT medicine and the testing thereof. For the former, we trained a set of enumerators with knowledge of the local area and local language on how to use a prepared script when approaching the outlet to procure the anti-malaria drug in an authentic manner. According to the script, the mystery shopper was buying medicine for her sick uncle. The mystery shopper described the age of the uncle (48), symptoms common for malaria, and that she wished to purchase Coartem. Although Coartem is an ACT brand name, the term is commonly used in Uganda for artemisinin-based combination therapy drugs. Each mystery shopper used the same script for each drug purchase. The goal of having trained mystery shoppers is that the transaction would be as authentic as possible, and the purchased drugs would represent the average quality of the ACT drugs sold at the drug store. This method, however, restricted the number of purchases from each drug store to one single adult dose of antimalarials, making our data cross-sectional, since multiple purchases could have made the store owner suspicious. After the purchase was completed, and once out of sight of the store owner, the surveyor recorded the drug price and other information relevant to the purchase. The samples were then transferred to our testing facility in Kampala. To prevent deterioration, we followed standard procedures and kept the drugs away from light in a dry and cool place.

Chemical analyses of medicines like ACTs can be performed using several techniques (see e.g. Nayyar et al., 2012). Our method of quality testing was Raman spectroscopy (RS) through the use of a TruScan handheld scanner. The TruScan scanner illuminates a sample (pill) with a laser beam and measures the reflecting Raman spectra. The Raman spectra provide a fingerprint by which the molecule composition of the sample can be identified. The fingerprint is then tested against an authentic reference sample (purchased directly from the drug manufacturer), and if they are sufficiently similar, as given by a probabilistic algorithm, the sample passes the test and is considered authentic. In this paper we refer to drugs that do not pass the test as fake or low-quality drugs. The RS

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36To avoid having the mystery shopper provide false and possibly sensitive information about her own child when making the purchase, the script was designed to deal with the shopper’s sick uncle.

37 In only two cases did the outlet sell multiple brands with equivalent active ingredients and strength (if authentic). In these cases, the mystery shopper acquired the least expensive brand.

38 However, if the drug store owner suspects the mystery shopper as being from the national drug authority, and is aware of what types of drugs he is selling, the owner would most likely provide the mystery shopper with an authentic drug. In that case, we are reporting a lower bound on the number of fake drugs in the drugs stores.

39 It was important for this study not to make the drug store owner suspect of a random check by the drug authority (which also does happen in practice, although rarely).
methodology is not able to provide us with exact information on why a drug fails the test, and it could be due to no or low dose of the active ingredient, insufficient complementary ingredients, etc.\textsuperscript{40}

Our testing procedure using the RS handheld device followed standard operating procedures that were provided to us during training at the TruScan headquarters. Immediately after procurement of drugs in the field, all necessary information was recorded (e.g. brand, generic, manufacturer, strength, drug form etc.), and identical reference drugs were purchased from either the National Drug Authority (NDA), the manufacturer, or from pharmacies in Kampala recommended by the NDA.\textsuperscript{41} The reference ACT pills were authenticated through laboratory testing by Chemiphar Laboratory. 10 samples (full dose) of each reference antimalarial drug were tested in the lab. The laboratory tests confirmed that the reference drugs perfectly matched the ingredients as specified by the pharmaceutical companies and the authentic pills included in the reference library were deemed authentic. Thereafter, testing of our drugs purchased in the field started and a sample of six pills from each drug store was tested, for a total of 558 pills.

An important advantage of Raman spectroscopy compared to alternative laboratory methods is speed. Another important advantage is that compared to laboratory testing, which requires a fairly large set of pills to test, and thus would require multiple purchases or the purchase of more than one dose of tablets, the TruScan method provides a quality indicator per tested tablet.

Methods comparing Raman spectroscopy to traditional laboratory methods have found a high degree of consistency across methods (e.g. Bate et al., 2011; Dégardin et. al, 2017). In this sense, we follow a standard protocol for assessing drug quality.\textsuperscript{42} Despite being widely used by pharmaceutical companies worldwide and national drug enforcement agencies to test for counterfeit and substandard medicines, the RS method does not provide exact details of a drug sample. However, a drug that fails the RS test due to extreme climatic conditions or because it has poor-quality due to the manufacturer’s inadequate quality control, will almost certainly exhibit reduced clinical effectiveness and it is reasonable to conclude that the drug is of low quality. Exactly how much clinical effectiveness

\textsuperscript{40}A drug sample in our data that failed the RS test could therefore be said to be a SSFFC drug, as opposed to an authentic drug.

\textsuperscript{41}In total we had 9 types of ACT drugs purchased in field (difference by brand, strength and/or manufacturer etc.).

\textsuperscript{42}Nine out of the ten largest pharmaceutical companies worldwide rely on Raman spectroscopy technology to authenticate inputs. Moreover, a growing number of national drug enforcement agencies use the TruScan Raman Spectrometer to test for counterfeit and substandard medicines. The Raman spectroscopy methodology has been used and evaluated extensively in the medical literature, specifically in the context of quality testing of anti-malarial drugs.
is reduced is not known. If the drug purchased in the village fails the test compared to the authentic drug, it is reasonable to claim that “quality” of the drugs purchased in the village is lower than the authentic drug whatever the reason for that quality drop is.

To measure households’ beliefs about the quality of antimalarials sold by the drug stores, we asked each respondent in the household survey the question "Do you expect that the antimalarial medicines sold by the nearest drug store are fake?". A Likert scale with four categories was provided, including "no, none of them", "yes, a few of them", "yes, most of them", and "yes, all of them".

To measure demand and treatment behavior, we asked about treatment of children reported sick with malaria in the last month, including the source of the medicine, type of antimalarial drug bought, and number of tablets acquired.43

5 Results

5.1 Summary statistics

Balance tests
Table 1 reports mean pre-treatment characteristics for the intervention and control groups, along with test statistics for the equality of means. Panel A uses the full sample of 99 villages while Panel B uses data from the sample of 57 villages with drug stores at baseline.

There is no systematic difference between the intervention and the control group at baseline and most differences in characteristics are small. Thus, the random assignment of villages appears to be successful. Malaria morbidity among children under 5, here defined as share of children reported to have fallen sick with malaria in the last month, is 43% in the intervention group (41% in the control group), and 41% (37% in the control group) of these children were reported to have been treated with ACTs. Most households (60% in the intervention and 58% in the control group) buy their ACT drugs from private drug stores. ACT drugs are believed to be highly effective, although non-ACT drugs, including Chloroquine, Quinine, and SP, are also viewed as being effective by most households in both groups.44 28% of the households in the treatment group (26% in the control group) believe the nearest drug store sells fake antimalarial drugs and 32%

43 There is no direct translation for the word “malaria” in the local languages, but rather a set of words to describe it. The enumerators used the most common phrase "omusujja gwa malaria" (“fever caused by malaria” in direct translation) in the Luganda speaking areas and equivalent translations in the other local languages.

44 The fact that chloroquine is viewed as being effective, despite the high rate of chloroquine resistance, provides further indication of a noisy learning environment. Frosch et al. (2011) estimate a chloroquine resistance in Uganda of nearly 100%. 
(36% in the control group) incorrectly believe that direct contact with someone who has a fever and intake of contaminated food can cause malaria. The average village size is 194 households (199 in the control group). The share of villages with at least one private drug store and the number of private drug stores are higher in the control group, although the differences between the groups are not statistically significant. As the number of drug stores may influence the likelihood of fake drugs being sold, we include the number of drug stores in the vector of pre-intervention village-specific covariates.45

The means are similar in the smaller sample of villages with a drug store at baseline (Panel B). As in the full sample, the means are also balanced across intervention and control villages on nearly all outcomes. The means are also similar to the full sample.46

Prevalence of fake drugs
How common are fake ACT drugs? Table 2 provides summary statistics of the prevalence of fake drugs in the control group.47 36.8% of the drug stores sell fake ACTs.48 The prevalence is highest in the western, and most rural, districts (Bushenyi and Mbarara), and lowest in the district closest to the capital Kampala (Mpigi). Overall, 19.4% of all drugs fail the authenticity test. This number, however, includes data from stores where all the tested samples passed the test. When conditioning the sample on drug stores where at least one sample (pill) failed the authenticity test, 51.5% of the tested ACT drugs fail.49

The last rows in Table 2 report the prevalence of fake ACTs conditional on the market structure in the villages. In both villages with a monopoly seller and in villages with more than one drug store in the village market, fake ACTs are common.

Observability of drug quality before purchase
In our model antimalarial medicine quality is not known and cannot easily be inferred based on observable characteristics before purchase. To assess this assumption, we had ten independent surveyors (who had not taken part in any of our other data collection

45We also include village size (number of households) and a measure of demand for ACT drugs (share of households that believes ACT is highly effective) as additional controls.
46The main difference, by comparing means across the two samples and noting that panel B is a subset of panel A, is in the source of ACTs. In villages with a drug store, 20% (or 10 percentage points) more household acquire ACT drugs from private drug stores as compared to a village without a drug store.
47We did not purchase drugs from local drug stores at baseline and are therefore using the control group sample at follow-up to describe prevalence of fake drugs.
48We also tested ACT quality from samples bought from 10 NGO saleswomen. All pills passed the authenticity test.
49It is plausible that our results in Table 2 provide a lower bound since the mystery shoppers were instructed to purchase a package of ACTs. Buying less than a full dose of ACTs when seeking treatment is a common practice. As the patient or caregiver will then have to judge the quality by only observing the blister package or single tablets, the ability to sell fake drugs as authentic should become easier.
activities) visually inspect each sample and make an assessment of whether they believed the drugs were fake or not. They were only able to use visual characteristics (such as the color and size of the box, blister pack and pills, type of cardboard used for the box, characteristics of the text on the box and blister pack, type and presence of holograms, etc.) to make their assessment. Individual samples were sequentially presented and the inspectors’ assessments were reported after each sample. To set prior beliefs in a manner consistent with the data, the inspectors were only informed of the overall share of fake drugs in the sample they were asked to assess but no other information (such as price or purchase location) was given. If visual cues reveal quality the predictive power of their assessment should be high. This was, however, not the case: the R-squared from a regression of the visual assessment of quality indicates that visual assessment explains only 3% of the variation in actual quality. Thus, observability of drug quality before purchase is very low.\textsuperscript{50}

**Price-Quality Distributions**

Regarding the price-quality relationship, even if quality is not directly observable before purchase, in equilibrium, prices and quality may be correlated as the former could provide a signal of the latter. A strand of the theoretical literature suggests that prices may or may not function as a signal of quality, depending on the context (Metrick and Zeckhauser, Milgrom and Roberts, 1986; 1999; Shapiro, 1982; Wolinsky, 1983). In our stylized model, for example, this could be true across local markets but not within (since drug stores will pool on the same price within the same market), assuming that the cost for stores to acquire high-quality drugs relative to low-quality drugs is constant across markets, and that disease conditions and incumbents types are drawn from the same distributions in all locations. These are obviously strong assumptions. Further, a higher cost of acquiring quality drugs leads to a higher equilibrium price in the model, all else equal. It also increases the parameter space for which it is optimal for an opportunistic type to sell low-quality drugs, suggesting a negative relationship between price and quality across markets. In other words, it is somewhat unclear what to expect empirically using simple price-quality correlations in observational data.\textsuperscript{51}

\textsuperscript{50}We only used data from control villages for this exercise, to avoid the possibility that treatment somehow improved observability of drug quality based on visual characteristics. That said, predictive power is nearly the same (with an R-square of 4%) if we include all villages, which is consistent with assumptions in the model in the sense that observing drug quality is not possible before purchase in both treatment and control villages.

\textsuperscript{51}There is scant evidence on the relationship between quality and price in the pharmaceutical markets of developing countries. Bate et. al. (2011) is an exception. Using data for several different types of drugs collected from 185 drug stores across 17 countries they find a negative correlation between fake drugs and price, controlling for various local factors. They conclude, however, that although drugs that fail quality
Figure 4 shows the price distributions for authentic and fake drugs across stores in the control group. It displays the variation across stores within districts in order to hold constant broad geographical factors such as transport costs and disease environments that affect price. As evident, the two price distributions strongly overlap, and using price to infer quality appears to be very noisy in this context, broadly consistent with the message of our model.

5.2 Main Results: Experimental evidence

Quality
To investigate whether entry by the NGO led to better quality in the market, we start by presenting intention-to-treat (ITT) estimates using the 99-villages sample; that is, we use the sample of all experimental villages including those with no drug stores at baseline. The dependent variable here is number of drug stores selling fake drugs in the village. The simple treatment-control difference, controlling for the stratified random design using district fixed effects, is -0.26. That is, the intervention reduced the number of private drug stores selling fake ACT drugs by 63% (Table 3, column 1). The difference is smaller, -0.20, when controlling for number of baseline drugs stores, village size, and a proxy of demand for ACTs. However, the difference is still quantitatively large – a 46% fall in number of stores selling fake drugs – albeit somewhat less precisely estimated (column 2).

Columns 3-4 use the core sample of 135 drugs stores identified at baseline to estimate reduced form effects from increased competition. These reduced form effects capture both changes along the extensive (exit of drug stores from the market for ACTs) and intensive (changes in behavior by outlets remaining in the ACT market) margins. The entry of the NGO resulted in a 15-17 percentage point reduction in the share of stores selling fake drugs and the point estimates are precisely estimated (columns 3-4). That is, out of all stores at baseline, more than 50% either stopped selling ACTs or switched from selling fake drugs to authentic drugs. In the online Appendix A we further show that the results are not sensitive to functional form choices in how we define quality sold by the drug store, as we get quantitatively very similar results regardless if we use the baseline dummy, the share of tested pills, or a dummy indicating that the majority of pills failed the quality test (see Table C.1).

52 tests are priced slightly lower on average, the price dispersion is so large that consumers cannot ensure the purchase of high quality through high price alone.

52In the 99-villages sample, 42 villages did not have a drug store within the village boundary at baseline.
Exit

Our model outlines two mechanisms through which this reduction in fake drugs sold could come about: exit of drug stores selling bad quality ACTs from the market (extensive margin) or a switch from selling low-quality to high-quality drugs (intensive margin). It is worth noting that these pharmacies sell a multitude of drugs and products, and so conceptually what we are interested in is whether they stop selling the relevant product (ACTs). Thus, what we are interested in is exit in a narrow sense of the product space, not whether the store ceases to exist.\footnote{There is also no evidence that the NGO caused drug stores to close, either temporarily or permanently.} Put simply, if the drug shop did not sell ACT medicines at the time of our shopper’s visit because the shop was closed or because the shopkeeper said they do not have any ACTs to sell, we regard this as exit from the ACT market. In columns 5-6 of Table 3, we estimate the treatment effect on this type of exit. The estimates are positive but not statistically significant. Thus, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the true effect in the "population" is zero, implying that the reduction in the share of private drug stores selling fake ACT drugs is driven solely by an intensive margin effect. That said, the estimated magnitudes indicate that outlets in the treatment group are more likely to be closed and/or less likely to sell ACTs. We can use the exit estimate to do a back-of-the-envelope calculation of the relative magnitudes of the two channels. Specifically, if the differential increase in the share of drug stores exiting was driven solely by the exit of drug stores selling fake drugs at baseline in the treatment group, and assuming the baseline share of fake-selling stores out of the total number of stores is the same across groups, the point estimate of a 7.7 percentage point increase implies that approximately half of the treatment effect on quality (column 4, Table 3) is caused by the exit of firms selling fake drugs at baseline. Considering the standard errors, however, this back-of-the-envelope calculation is obviously only suggestive.\footnote{This orthogonality condition is arguably a natural assumption to make given that the villages were randomly assigned into treatment.}

Prices

Our model suggests that if the NGO enters with a lower price, both honest and opportunistic drug stores will pool on the lower price. Using the mystery shopper data, Table 4 shows that the entry of the NGO resulted in a fall in the average price of ACTs in incumbent drug stores by approximately 16\% (from an average baseline price of 8,910 Ugandan shillings in control villages to approximately 7,400 Ugandan shillings in the treatment villages). As the price of ACTs sold by the NGO in treatment villages was approximately 7,000 Ugandan shillings at the time of the intervention, the difference between the average price among drug stores and the NGO price therefore decreased from about 27\% to
6\%\, on average. In fact, we can directly measure the absolute price difference of the store relative to the price set by the NGO, and estimate whether prices are on average closer. The estimates in columns 5-6 show that indeed prices in treatment villages are closer to the NGO’s price. On average, they are about 18 percentage points closer in price. This is broadly consistent with the prediction of the model that stores will pool on the price of the NGO.

Finally, it is worth pointing out that since the intervention led to lower prices and increased quality, it also follows that local drug markets were characterized by a substantial prevalence of low-quality products accompanied by considerable mark-ups, as reflected in our model.

**Beliefs**

In our model, reputation forces drive the new equilibrium. When the NGO enters it is more difficult to get away with selling low quality, partly because consumers have better ability to learn about the quality of the drugs sold. Table 5 provides suggestive evidence of such reputation forces, estimating effects on beliefs among households in our survey data. They are suggestive since it is a necessary but not sufficient condition that households have some ability to infer quality. Thus, while not conclusive, the results are informative of this mechanism being at play. In columns 1-2, we exploit cross-sectional household data collected at endline to estimate the share of households that believes the nearest incumbent drug store sells fake drugs. Since the sample is relatively small (from the 57 villages with drug stores at baseline we only collected data for a random subset of 26 villages due to budgetary constraints), one may worry about sampling variance giving rise to spurious results. To ensure that results are not driven by sampling variance, i.e. random pre-existing village-level differences in the outcome before the intervention arising, in columns 3-4 we add baseline data from all 57 villages and estimate effects using difference-in-differences. Regardless of the specification, we find statistically significant effects and if anything the point estimates become larger in magnitude with more controls and the addition of baseline data. Households in intervention villages were approximately 8-11 percentage points, or about 20\%, less likely to believe that incumbent stores sell fake antimalarials as compared to control villages. The evidence is thus consistent with our model and the role of reputation forces being an important mechanism driving the new equilibrium.

**Quantity**

\footnote{Results are robust to using ordered logit regression instead. Results not shown for brevity.}
Table 6 presents estimates of the effects on quantity using the household survey data. The data allows us to measure drug sourcing behavior of episodes for all children reported sick with malaria using either endline data alone (columns 1, 3 and 5) or in the combined baseline and endline data (columns 2, 4 and 6). Columns 1-2 show that there is no evidence of entry affecting the likelihood of sick children being treated with ACTs, as compared to treatment with non-ACT antimalarials, of any quantity. It is common practice, however, to buy less than a full dose and outlets typically offer a price per pill. Columns 3-4 show that the entry of the NGO affected the intensity of ACT treatment and households in the treatment villages were more likely to have treated their child with a full ACT dose. This is consistent with the fact that the NGO insisted that the saleswomen only sold full doses to customers. The estimates imply that conditional on ACT treatment households acquired 2-2.4 more pills per sick child. From a baseline of 6.8 pills in control villages, this implies a 29%-35% increase in ACT quantity. This suggests that the NGO entry increased the total size of the market for ACTs. Columns 5-6 further show that the increase in ACT quantity is not driven by sourcing from incumbent drug stores.

Together, the evidence suggests that private drug stores lost market share when the NGO entered, but that their total quantity sold was not particularly affected. As the model suggests, this result is likely due to a combination of market forces. First, due to increased competition from the NGO, the inverse demand curve facing drug stores would have shifted inward (a substitution effect). Second, due to a lower price in drug stores, as Table 4 shows, there would have been movement down the inverse demand curve (a price effect). Third, expected quality of drug stores increased, as the evidence in Table 5 shows, so the inverse demand curve facing drug stores would have shifted outward (a beliefs effect). The results in Table 6 suggest that these demand forces approximately canceled each other out. Is also important to keep in mind that while the saleswomen provided a convenient service going door-to-door, it was not a full-time activity. On average, each conducted about 10 household visits per day. Therefore, if someone was sick with malaria and desired treatment immediately, they may have found it optimal to go to the drug store even if expected quality was slightly worse and the price was slightly higher.

Finally, these results suggest that the first-order welfare consequences of the NGO entry in the retail ACT market are relatively clear: with lower equilibrium prices, higher quality, and largely unaffected quantity, it is reasonable to conclude that producer surplus (drug store profits) decreased due to entry. With higher quality and lower prices, consumer surplus arguably increased (directly due to the NGO selling authentic drugs at lower prices, and indirectly due to the externality effects on drug stores’ quality and

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56No data was collected on treatment of adults.
5.3 Discussion and External Validity

Baseline competition
An important question is whether effects depend on pre-existing competition between incumbents. Our data shows is not uncommon to have more than one incumbent. A natural question is then whether the effectiveness of the NGO is sensitive to initial market size. While the model is silent with respect to heterogeneous treatment effects as a function of the number of incumbents, it may still be of interest to study heterogeneous impacts along this dimension. We present such results in Appendix Table C.2. We find no strong evidence that pre-existing competition matters for the treatment effect. The sign of the interaction effect points in the direction that the effects of entry are, if anything, smaller in villages with a single incumbent, but one cannot statistically reject that effects are the same in villages with one or multiple incumbents.58

Market boundaries and spillovers
In the data, we estimate the impact on incumbents where there is an NGO saleswoman going door-to-door in the same village. This seems appropriate given that the NGO saleswomen had well-defined designated catchment areas – the village – within which the saleswomen were allowed to operate door-to-door. To ensure compliance, the NGO also had monitoring mechanisms in place through branch officers. Our survey data confirms that the saleswomen largely respected these boundaries, as very few households in control villages reported buying medicine from the NGO saleswomen. Randomization at the village level provides a relatively straightforward econometric interpretation comparing

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57It is worth noting that the NGO sells their products to the saleswomen at a small but positive mark-up above the wholesale cost, and that the retail price is set so that the saleswomen have a small mark-up as well. Of course, marginal profit is not the same as producer surplus, and for a complete welfare analysis one would need to include the fixed cost for the NGO.

58The model suggests that the marginal cost of acquiring high-quality drugs among incumbents is a key determinant of quality. This object is likely heterogeneous, but unobservable to the econometrician. Thus, one cannot empirically test how these costs influence the treatment effect. That said, anecdotal evidence suggests that to acquire authentic drugs, instead of acquiring drugs from the nearest larger wholesaler, available in most of the larger cities, drug store owners could in principle travel to Kampala and acquire drugs directly from licensed wholesalers, importers and producers that are closely monitored by the government. Consistent with this idea, our data suggests that the relative travel distance to Kampala versus the district capital, as measured by Google Maps, is negatively correlated with drug quality in the control villages, whereas this correlation is not present in the treatment villages. These patterns in the data are broadly consistent with the stylized model in the sense that once the NGO enters, cost structure ceases to matter as opportunistic types will either start selling high quality or exit. These patterns are available in the online Appendix, Figure C.4.
outcomes for drug stores with and without the NGO saleswoman operating in the village of the drug store.

That said, there may be spillovers across treatment and control villages. First, for any given drug store, we would naturally expect the competitive pressure of the NGO’s catchment areas to be a function of distance in a continuous sense. Second, while the NGO saleswomen were restricted geographically, a competing drug store is naturally allowed to sell to any customer. Therefore, from the perspective of the drug store, there was not a strict market boundary. Third, many households were located in villages without a local drug store, yet had at least one store within reasonable walking distance. That is particularly relevant in this context as villages in the sample are located relatively near one another. In our baseline household survey data, we can measure how far away from a drug store each household is located. Households with a drug store in their village are located approximately 0.6 km from a drug store, on average. For those who do not have a drug store in the village, the average distance is about 1.5 km. Given a walking speed of about 3-4 km per hour, for a typical household in these villages it would take roughly one hour to walk back and forth to the nearest drug store. Together, it follows that the competitive pressure of the NGO as a whole for a drug store is increasing in the share of its customers that overlap with the catchment area of all NGO saleswomen, within a given distance.

The most obvious implication of these spillovers across treatment and control villages is that our baseline estimates can be interpreted as lower bounds of the true effects, since some of the control shops may effectively be treated to some extent. To complement our baseline approach, we also perform a robustness analysis allowing for the forces above to be at play. We describe the data and variable construction in detail in the online Appendix B. The key difference to the baseline specification is that we define a new variable, NGO Competition, as the population share within some distance \( d \) of a drug store \( i \) that overlaps with catchment areas of all NGO saleswomen. In particular, we use three intervals each consisting of a 2.5 kilometers radius bandwidth: 0 - 2.5 km, 2.5 - 5 km, 5 - 7.5 km. We would expect effects to be monotonically decreasing with distance, since the customer base should be a function of walking distance for households. To maintain the exogeneity based on randomization of catchment areas, we include controls for the expected value of NGO Competition given that each catchment area had a 50% chance of being randomized to either the treatment or control group. Since we expect a high degree of spatial dependence based on the data construction, we use standard errors allowing for various spatial dependencies.

The results confirm that the effects on drug quality depend on distance, dissipating at
longer distances from the NGO catchment areas. The regression results are presented in Appendix C, Table C.3 and Figure C.3. The effects are negative and statistically significant up to 2.5 km, with suggestive evidence of effects up to 5 km. There is no evidence of effects beyond 5 km.

In sum, these results effectively give rise to two takeaways. First, perhaps unsurprisingly they indicate spatial relationships between the NGO, drug stores and households matter for how large the effects are. Second, and just as importantly, they provide a robustness test which confirms the basic story of the paper: nearby presence of NGO saleswomen induces higher quality drugs among incumbents in the market.

**Household beliefs about incumbent’s drug quality**

Another interesting question is whether the effects of the NGO depend on what beliefs households have about drug quality of incumbents at baseline. It is somewhat ambiguous what we should expect here. On the one hand, if beliefs are consistent in equilibrium they should, in principle, reflect local conditions, including whether the incumbent is honest or opportunistic. On the other hand, if households are very skeptical about drug quality in general, perhaps due to low trust in the supply chain as a whole or the ability for the government to monitor the market and enforce the law, then distrust in drug stores may lead to distrust in the NGO as well. Put simply, distrust may be deep and go beyond local conditions. In this case, when distrust is high the NGO may be less effective in moving the market equilibrium as incumbents are less threatened by the NGO. In the Appendix Table C.4, we estimate heterogeneous treatment effects as a function of the share of household survey respondents in the village, at baseline, who believe that the nearest drug store sells fake drugs. The evidence points to weaker effects of entry when distrust is high, but we cannot consistently reject the null hypothesis that effects are the same in villages with high and low distrust.

6 Conclusion

To our knowledge, this is the first study to use a randomized intervention to study the determinants of drug quality in developing countries. We document that the market for antimalarial medicines in Uganda is plagued by low quality, and provide evidence that entry by an NGO that sold a superior product had a significant impact on the market equilibrium. Specifically, one year after the new market actor entered, the share of incumbent firms selling fake drugs dropped by more than 50% in the intervention markets compared to the control markets. In addition to the quality improvements, price decreased, market
size increased through higher demand, and the incumbents enjoyed a better reputation among households living in the village. While assessing the total welfare impact is beyond the scope of our study, the results on quality, price and quantity demanded make it clear that such entry can substantially increase consumer surplus. Moreover, a long-term follow up study by Björkman Nyqvist, Guariso, Svensson, Yanagizawa-Drott (2019) provides complementary evidence that the intervention improved health outcomes, including child mortality. While health outcomes may not be solely affected through an improved market equilibrium, consisting of higher drug quality and lower price, together the studies indicate that finding feasible and scalable solutions to fix dysfunctional markets for medicines is of first-order importance for policymakers.

Previous literature has found similar results in different settings. Bennett and Yin’s (2019) paper from Hyderabad in India is closest to our paper and studies the impact of a larger chain store entry on quality and price in the retail drug market. They find the chain store entry to improve drug quality (5% improvement) and decrease prices (2%) at incumbent retailers. Although the results across our studies are similar with improved market outcome for the consumers following the entry of an agent selling high-quality drugs there are several differences across the two studies. Bennet and Yin explore a natural experiment where a chain pharmacy opened stores in a subset of the larger planned market due to limited availability in the retail space. In this paper we explore exogenous variation through a randomized controlled experiment in the entry of a new agent selling authentic drugs in the villages. There are also differences across the two studies in the type of agent selling authentic drugs. We are studying a micro-entrepreneur (community health worker) while Bennet and Yin are studying a pharmacy chain which exploits scale economies in distribution and signaling to offer high-quality drugs at lower cost. Moreover, the setting is also different and the market in Hyderabad in India had higher drug quality compared to the local markets in Uganda at the time of our study. Both studies are using mystery shopper audits of the pharmacies to purchase drugs, while Bennet and Yin conduct laboratory tests for drug quality testing and we use the Raman spectroscopy methodology. Despite several differences between our papers, the similar impact jointly strengthens the conclusion that introduction of agents selling high-quality drugs can drastically increase the quality and lower prices on the local pharmaceutical market in low-income settings. Another paper related to this study is Fitzpatrick (2020) which conducts a randomized audit study in the Ugandan antimalarial market to test the impact on prices and prescription behaviour when (trained standardized) patients self-diagnose or know the first-line treatment during the drug purchase. Fitzpatrick finds that patient self-diagnosing and information about first-line treatment slightly decrease drug
prices and worsen prescribing behaviour. Fitzpatrick (2020) is a complementary study to our paper on the Ugandan antimalarial market and it explicitly shows how patient behaviour during the actual drug purchase can impact prices and prescription behaviour among pharmacists. However, Fitzpatrick (2020) does not study the impact on drug quality which is the main outcome of our study.59

The results found in this paper, together with the above related studies, provide policy implications but also point to an agenda for future research. In markets for experience goods and credence goods, reputational incentives are key for driving quality. Other approaches to improving drug quality related to decreasing consumer misconceptions and enhancing their ability to update their priors about drug quality. Examples of such interventions include providing information to consumers about what fraction of fevers are actually malaria in their area, or subsidizing better diagnostics so that people become more aware of whether they actually have malaria or just fever. The latter is related to the Fitzpatrick (2020) study discussed above where she finds that when patients show knowledge of their diagnosis and first-line treatment they pay a lower price for the antimalarial drugs, i.e. the more aware patients are of their diagnosis the less likely the drug store is to abuse the buyer with high price and worse quality (although, again, quality was not studied in the Fitzpatrick paper). Another set of approaches would be to focus on directly improving drug quality at the local drug stores. For example, involving government agencies to conduct random quality assessments at drugs stores and publishing the results publicly to increase reputational cost or facilitating entry of larger firms or market chains that sell authentic drugs and thereby helping consumers learn about quality. The latter approach was shown to be successful in Bennet and Yin’s (2019) paper. All of these approaches would help strengthen incentives for higher quality. Which type of policy intervention would be most cost-effective in combating low-quality antimalarial medicines is beyond the scope of this paper but remains an important area for future work.

Finally, antimalarial medicines form part of a wider set of products where quality is not directly observable at the time of purchase, and only partially observable when used. Thus, while we focus on a particular, albeit important, market, our findings also apply to markets beyond pharmaceuticals. Evidence and news reports suggest that product quality in markets for experience goods and credence goods more broadly, such as fertilizers and seeds, gasoline, auto parts, electronics, baby food, and hygiene products (Mwakalebela, 2012; OECD, 2008; Rajput, 2012; Tentena, 2012), is notoriously low in developing countries. Studying the markets for these products is important because poor quality aris-

59Since we had a similar purchasing behaviour in our treatment and control groups the behaviour of the mystery shopper during the purchase could not impact our findings.
ing from weak incentives for building reputation can have adverse welfare consequences not only by affecting health outcomes, but also productivity and willingness to experiment and adopt new technologies. Our study indicates that while reputational forces matter, the fact that a large share of retailers sold low-quality products in the absence of the intervention indicates that reputation building is a low return investment, arguably as learning is very noisy for consumers. A recent study by Bai (2018) finds similar results, using experimental variation and structural estimation methods to investigate the quality of food in the watermelon market in China. The author provides evidence of reputational incentives for quality being weak; similarly, evidence from the market for agricultural inputs (fertilizers and hybrid seeds) in Uganda by Bold et al. (2017) shows that quality - but not prices - varies tremendously across retailers and that while high-quality products are profitable to adopt, returns are negative for a non-trivial share of the quality distribution in the market. The negative productivity consequences of weak incentives for building reputation are clear. Thus, understanding the feasibility and cost-effectiveness of alternative interventions to improve reputation building mechanisms in these broader markets are important from a policymaking perspective, and to this end more research is needed.
7 References


Buchner, D., Kitutu, F., Cross, D., Nakamoga, E., P. Awor, 2019, A cross-sectional study to identify the distribution and characteristics of licensed and unlicensed private drug shops in rural Eastern Uganda to inform an iCCM intervention to improve health outcomes for children under five years, *PloS one*, 14(1), e0209641.


Glass, Beverley D, 2014, "Counterfeit drugs and medical devices in developing countries", Research and Reports in Tropical Medicine.


Figure 1. Examples of drug samples

![Image of two drug samples labeled A and B]

**Note:** The figure shows two samples of ACT drugs from the drug quality sample. Sample A failed the quality test, indicating it is fake, and sample B is an authentic drug that passed the quality test.

Figure 2. Sample districts

![Map of sample districts]
**Figure 3: Trial profile**

- **99 project villages**
  - 50 control villages
  - 49 treatment villages

- **Baseline**
  - Household survey (99 villages)

- **Baseline drug store census** (99 villages)

- **Drug quality survey** (all 57 villages with stores at baseline)

- **Endline**
  - Household survey (random set of 48 out of 99 villages, of which 26 had a store at baseline)

- **Control**
  - 80 drug stores (in 31 control villages)
  - 71 drug stores identified (29 villages)
  - 57 drug stores selling ACT (27 villages)

- **Treatment**
  - 57 project villages with a drug store
  - 55 drug stores (in 26 treatment villages)
  - 51 drug stores identified (25 villages)
  - 36 drug stores (20 villages) selling ACT

- **57 project villages with a drug store**
  - 50 control villages
  - 49 treatment villages
**Figure 4. Price and Quality Distributions**

Note: The figure shows the box plot distributions (median, 25th/75th percentile, lower/upper adjacent values) of prices, by quality, across stores within districts. The data is for the control villages only. The graph shows that the price distributions for authentic and fake drugs are highly overlapping and that inference of quality based solely on price is noisy.
### Table 1. Baseline Characteristics

#### Panel A: All Villages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household Characteristics</th>
<th>Obs.</th>
<th>Mean, Treatment</th>
<th>Mean, Control</th>
<th>Diff.</th>
<th>P-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male head of HH has secondary education, dummy</td>
<td>2'980</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male head of HH has tertiary education, dummy</td>
<td>2'980</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio ownership, dummy</td>
<td>2'980</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity, dummy</td>
<td>2'980</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thatched roof, dummy</td>
<td>2'967</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim HH, dummy</td>
<td>2'980</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of u5 children in HH</td>
<td>2'980</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child reported sick in malaria in the last month, dummy</td>
<td>5'159</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sick child was treated with ACT, dummy</td>
<td>2'169</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ACT was bought in a drug shop, dummy</td>
<td>749</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># ACT pills for treating sick child, any source</td>
<td>751</td>
<td>6.49</td>
<td>6.69</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has heard of ACT, dummy</td>
<td>2'980</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Believes ACT is highly effective, dummy</td>
<td>2'728</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Believes non-ACT drugs are highly effective, dummy</td>
<td>2'930</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Believes nearest drug shop sells fake drugs, dummy</td>
<td>2'841</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Village Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Obs.</th>
<th>Mean, Treatment</th>
<th>Mean, Control</th>
<th>Diff.</th>
<th>P-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of households in the village</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>193.6</td>
<td>199.3</td>
<td>-5.65</td>
<td>0.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of drug stores in the village</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>-0.48</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village has at least one drug store</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village is a local monopoly (one drug store)</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Panel B: Villages with Drug Stores at Baseline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household Characteristics</th>
<th>Obs.</th>
<th>Mean, Treatment</th>
<th>Mean, Control</th>
<th>Diff.</th>
<th>P-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male head of HH has secondary education, dummy</td>
<td>1'817</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male head of HH has tertiary education, dummy</td>
<td>1'817</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.06*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio ownership, dummy</td>
<td>1'817</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity, dummy</td>
<td>1'817</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thatched roof, dummy</td>
<td>1'810</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim HH, dummy</td>
<td>1'817</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of u5 children in HH</td>
<td>1'817</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child reported sick in malaria in the last month, dummy</td>
<td>3'087</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sick child was treated with ACT, dummy</td>
<td>1'263</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ACT was bought in a drug shop, dummy</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># ACT pills for treating sick child, any source</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>6.67</td>
<td>6.87</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has heard of ACT, dummy</td>
<td>1'817</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Believes ACT is highly effective, dummy</td>
<td>1'670</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Believes non-ACT drugs are highly effective, dummy</td>
<td>1'785</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Believes nearest drug shop sells fake drugs, dummy</td>
<td>1'723</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Note:
- There are 99 study villages in the full sample (of which 49 are treatment villages) and 57 villages with drug stores at baseline (of which 26 are treatment villages).
- Treatment is a door-to-door NGO saleswoman selling authentic ACT drugs in the village. P-values for household characteristics are calculated using village-clustered standard errors, and robust standard errors are used for village characteristics. In Panel A, the p-value for the joint significance is 0.44 when the treatment dummy is regressed on all the household-level variables and the randomization stratas (districts), using village-level clustered standard errors. In Panel B, *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance.
### Table 2. Prevalence of Fake Antimalarial Drugs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Drug stores selling fake drugs</th>
<th>Share of tested drugs that are fake</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All districts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36.8%</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By district</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bushenyi</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mbale</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mbarara</td>
<td>53.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpigi</td>
<td>26.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By local competition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monopoly</td>
<td>30.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition</td>
<td>38.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The sample consists of data from the control villages with drug stores selling ACT at the time of the drug quality survey. One adult dose was purchased by covert shoppers from each store. For each store sample, six pills were tested for authenticity using Raman Spectroscopy. A fake drug means that the pill failed the Raman test. In column 1 the number of observations N refers to the number of drug stores, and in columns 2-3 it refers to the number of tested pills. Column 2 reports the unconditional mean in the sample and column 3 reports the mean conditional on the stores selling fake drugs. Competition implies that there are more than one drug store selling ACTs in the village.
Table 3. Effects of NGO Entry: Quality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit of Analysis</th>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Drug shops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of drug stores selling fake drugs in the village</td>
<td>Drug stores sells fake drugs, dummy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO entry</td>
<td>(1) -0.263** (0.118)</td>
<td>(3) -0.153** (0.072)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) -0.195* (0.106)</td>
<td>(4) -0.169** (0.066)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District FE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dep. Var. Mean in Control</td>
<td>0.420</td>
<td>0.263</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: In columns 1-2 the unit of analysis is a village using the sample of all 99 villages. In columns 3-6 the unit of analysis is a drug store, where the sample contains all shops identified during the baseline store census. The dependent variables are: in columns 1-2, the number of drug stores in the village that sold ACT that failed the Raman Spectroscopy authenticity tests; in columns 3-4, a dummy indicating if the drug store sold any failed drugs during the quality survey, and zero otherwise (including cases where the store was not open or did not sell ACT); in columns 5-6, a dummy indicating whether the store did not sell ACT at the time of the drug quality survey. NGO entry is a dummy variable equal to one if there is a door-to-door NGO distributor selling ACT drugs in the village, and zero otherwise. The control variables are: number of drug stores at baseline, number of households at baseline, and share of baseline households that believe ACT are highly effective. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the village level (columns 4-6). *** 1% , ** 5% , * 10% significance.
Table 4. Effects of NGO Entry: Price

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit of Analysis</th>
<th>Drug Stores</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependent Variable:</td>
<td>Log(Price, Ush)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO entry</td>
<td>-0.146**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.058)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District FE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of villages</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dep. Var. Mean in Control</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The sample consists of all shops that sold ACT at the time of the drug quality survey. The dependent variable is the price for a full dose of ACT. The control variables are: number of drug stores at baseline, number of households at baseline, and share of baseline households that believe ACT are highly effective. The outcome variable: in columns (1)-(4), the price for a full dose in logs and levels, respectively, and; in columns (5) and (6), the percent absolute deviation from the price set by the NGO around the time of the intervention (7000 Ugandan shillings). OLS is used in all regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the village level. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance.
## Table 5. Effects of NGO Entry: Consumer Beliefs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NGO entry</td>
<td>-0.065**</td>
<td>-0.082**</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO entry*Post</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.112**</td>
<td>-0.116**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>2397</td>
<td>2397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit of Analysis</td>
<td>HH</td>
<td>HH</td>
<td>HH</td>
<td>HH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey Data</td>
<td>Post Only</td>
<td>Post Only</td>
<td>Pre &amp; Post</td>
<td>Pre &amp; Post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District FE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-survey Dummy</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample of villages</td>
<td>Shops at baseline</td>
<td>Shops at baseline</td>
<td>Shops at baseline</td>
<td>Shops at baseline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of villages</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dep. Var. Mean in</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The unit of observation is the household, restricting the sample to households in villages with drug stores at baseline to ensure that the household is referring to a drug store in the same village. The sample in columns 1-2 contains endline survey data. Columns 3-4 add baseline data from all villages with drug stores at baseline. The sample in columns 1-2 contains endline survey data. Columns 3-4 add baseline data from all villages with drug stores at baseline. The dependent variable is the answer to the survey question: "Do you expect that the antimalarial medicines sold by the nearest drug store are fake?". The answer is given according to the Likert scale: "No, none of them", "Yes, a few of them", "Yes, most of them", and "Yes, all of them". The dummy variable is equal to zero if the answer is "No, none of them", and one otherwise. The control variables are: number of drug stores at baseline, number of households at baseline, and share of baseline households that believe ACT are highly effective. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the village level. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance.
Table 6. Effects of NGO Entry: Quantity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable:</th>
<th>Treated with ACT, dummy</th>
<th># ACT pills, any source</th>
<th># ACT pills, sourced from drug stores</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OLS</td>
<td>OLS</td>
<td>OLS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO entry</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>1.898***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.068)</td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
<td>(0.635)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO entry*Post-survey</td>
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<td>2.391**</td>
<td>0.463</td>
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<td>(0.946)</td>
<td>(0.811)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>HH/Child</td>
<td>HH/Child</td>
<td>HH/Child</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample of villages</td>
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<td>Shops at baseline</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-survey Dummy</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey Data</td>
<td>Post</td>
<td>Pre &amp; Post</td>
<td>Post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of villages</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dep. Var. Mean in control</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Note: The sample consists of children reported sick in malaria in the last month. The sample in columns 1, 3, and 5 contains endline survey data from villages with drug stores at baseline. Columns 2, 4, and 6 add baseline data from villages with drug stores at baseline. The dependent variables are: in columns 1-2, a dummy indicating whether the child was treated with ACT, and zero if treated with non-ACT antimalarial; the number of pills that were acquired for treatment from any source (columns 3-4) or from private drug stores (columns 5-6), conditional on treatment with ACT. The control variables are: number of drug stores at baseline, number of households at baseline, and share of baseline households that believe ACT are highly effective. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the village level. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance.
Online Appendices:

Can Good Products Drive Out Bad?
A Randomized Intervention in the Antimalarial Medicine Market in Uganda

A. Conceptual Framework
B. Heterogenous Effects - A Spatial Estimation Approach
C. Figures and Tables
Appendix A: Conceptual Framework

Proposition 1

A: The opportunistic type always sells low-quality drugs

Deriving condition (10).

Inserting the expressions for price and demand from (6) and (8) in (9) gives:

\[
p^*_1(\mu)s^*_1(\mu) + \delta^1 p^*_2(\mu)s^*_2(\mu) > (p^*_1(\mu) - c)s^*_1(\mu) + \delta^1 p^*_2(1)s^*_2(1) + \delta^1 p^*_2(\mu)s^*_2(\mu),
\]

which simplifies to

\[
c > \bar{c} \equiv \frac{\delta p^*_2(1)s^*_2(1)}{2s^*_1(\mu)}
\]

as in condition (10).

B: Low-quality equilibrium with identical costs

Consider the case where \( c = c_H \). Then the left and right hand sides of (19) are equal if

\[
(\delta - 4)c^2 + 4\gamma \mu c - \gamma^2 \delta = 0.
\]

This quadratic equation has a maximum point since \( (\delta - 4) < 0 \), and two distinct roots if the discriminant \( (\Delta) \) is positive; that is if

\[
\Delta = 4\gamma^2 \left( 4\mu^2 + \delta^2 - 4\delta \right) > 0.
\]

A necessary condition for \( \Delta > 0 \) is thus that \( 4\mu^2 + \delta^2 - 4\delta > 0 \); i.e. that

\[
\mu > \sqrt{\delta - \frac{1}{4}\delta^2}.
\]

If (23) holds, then (10) holds for \( c = c_H \) provided that

\[
c_H \in \left[ \frac{-4\gamma \mu + \sqrt{\Delta}}{2(\delta - 4)}, \frac{-4\gamma \mu - \sqrt{\Delta}}{2(\delta - 4)} \right].
\]

C: The opportunistic type sells high-quality drugs in the first period
Deriving condition (12)

Inserting the expressions for price and demand from (6) and (8) in (11) gives:

\[(p_1^* (1) - c) s_1^* (1) + \delta p_2^* (\mu) s_2^* (\mu) > p_1^* (1) s_1^* (1) + \delta \frac{1}{2} p_2^* (\mu) s_2^* (\mu)\]

which simplifies to

\[c < \zeta \equiv \frac{\delta p_2^* (\mu) s_2^* (\mu)}{2s_1^* (1)}, \]

as in condition (12).

**Proposition 3**

Deriving condition (16)

Substituting (13) and (14) in (15) gives:

\[(1 - \omega) p^* (1) - c) s_1^I (1) + \delta (1 - \omega) p^* (\bar{\mu}) s_2^I (\bar{\mu}) > (1 - \omega) p^* (1) s_1^I (1)\]

which simplifies to

\[c < \zeta (\omega) \equiv \frac{\delta (1 - \omega) p^* (\bar{\mu}) s_2^I (\bar{\mu})}{s_1^I (1)}, \]

i.e., condition (16).

Deriving condition (18)

Substituting (13) and (14) in (17) gives:

\[(1 - \omega) p^* (\mu) s_1^I (\mu) - ((1 - \omega) p^* (\mu) - c) s_1^I (\mu) - \delta \frac{1}{2} \left[ (1 - \omega) p^* (\bar{\mu}) s_2^I (\bar{\mu}) + (1 - \omega) p^* (1) s_2^I (1) \right] > 0,\]

which simplifies to

\[c > \bar{\zeta} (\omega) \equiv \frac{\delta \frac{1}{2} \left[ (1 - \omega) p^* (\bar{\mu}) s_2^I (\bar{\mu}) + (1 - \omega) p^* (1) s_2^I (1) \right]}{s_1^I (\mu)}, \]

as in condition (18).

Note that \(\zeta (\omega) \leq \bar{\zeta} (\omega)\) as the denominator in (28) is strictly smaller than the denominator in (30), and the numerator in (30) is strictly larger than the numerator in (28) for
\[ \mu < 1. \]

Note further that \( \frac{\partial}{\partial \omega} c(\omega) < 0 \) and that \( c(\omega) > \bar{c} \) (given in (20)), at least for a sufficiently small \( \omega \) and a sufficiently large \( \mu \). To see this, consider the case where \( \omega = 0 \). Then

\[ c(0) = \frac{\delta p^* (\bar{\mu}) s_1^l (\bar{\mu})}{s_1^l (1)} > \frac{\delta p^* (1) s_2^* (1)}{2s_1^* (\mu)} = \bar{c}, \]

which simplifies to

\[ 2 (\gamma \bar{\mu} + c_H) (\gamma \bar{\mu} - c_H) (\gamma \mu - c_H) > (\gamma + c_H) (\gamma - c_H)^2, \]

which strictly holds when \( \mu \to 1. \)

**Two opportunistic types compete**

Consider the case when two opportunistic types compete; i.e. \( S = \{S_1, S_2\} \), where \( S_1 \) denotes seller 1 and \( S_2 \) denotes seller 2. We assume that consumers face small search costs; so the equilibrium price, when two honest types compete is \( p = p^* \). The opportunistic types will mimic honest types in their price setting behavior; i.e. \( p^*_i = p^* \). Consider first the equilibrium where the opportunistic sellers sell high quality in period 1 and low-quality in period 2. This is an equilibrium if

\[ \pi^O (1, 0|\{1, 1\} \{1, 0\}) > \pi^O (0, 0|\{1, 1\} \{1, 0\}) . \]

That is, if

\[ (p^* (1) - c) s_1^S (1) + \delta p^* (\bar{\mu}) s_2^S (\bar{\mu}) > p^* (1) s_1^S (1), \]

which, by substituting (13) and (14) in (33), simplifies to

\[ c < c < \frac{\delta p^* (\bar{\mu}) s_1^l (\bar{\mu})}{s_1^l (1)} \equiv c(0) . \]

Maximizing short run profits by selling low-quality drugs in the first period is an equilibrium if

\[ \pi^O (0, 0|\{1, 1\} \{0, 0\}) > \pi^O (1, 0|\{1, 1\} \{0, 0\}) , \]
that is if

\[(37) \quad p^*(\mu) s^S_1(\mu) + \frac{1}{2} \delta p^*(\bar{\mu}) s^S_2(\bar{\mu}) > (p^*(\mu) - c) s^S_1(\mu) + p^*(1) s^*_1(1).\]

That is if

\[c > \frac{p^*(1) s^*_1(1) - \frac{1}{2} \delta p^*(\bar{\mu}) s^S_2(\bar{\mu})}{s^S_1(\mu)} \equiv \bar{c}'.\]

Note that \(\bar{c}' > \bar{c}(0)\).
Appendix B: Heterogenous Effects - A Spatial Estimation Approach

In our baseline estimation of the effects on drug quality among incumbent stores, we estimate the impact of having an NGO saleswoman operating in the same village as the drug store. This seems appropriate given that the NGO saleswoman had a designated catchment area where she was allowed to operate; going door-to-door within the village. The NGO monitored the saleswomen through its branch offices to ensure compliance. Our survey data also confirms that the NGO saleswomen largely respected these boundaries, as very few households in control villages report buying medicine from these saleswomen. Therefore, the randomization was done at the village level. From an econometric perspective it is therefore quite straightforward to compare outcomes for drug stores with and without the NGO saleswoman operating in the village of the drug store; we would obviously expect the former type of stores to be much more exposed to the competition induced by the NGO.

That said, there are a few reasons to expand the analysis beyond this simple approach. First, while the NGO saleswomen were restricted geographically, the competing drug stores were obviously allowed to sell to anyone. Second, many households are located in villages without a drug store, but nevertheless have at least one store within reasonable walking distance. Villages in our sample are located relatively near to another. To see this, in our baseline household survey data, we measure how far away from a drug store each household is located. Households who have a drug store in their village are located approximately 0.6 km from a drug store, on average. For those which do not have a drug store in the village, the average distance is about 1.5 km. Given these distances, and given a walking speed of about 3-4 km per hour, it is reasonable to conclude that the majority of the households in our data have a drug store relatively nearby where they most likely buy drugs from.

Therefore, in practice the drug store’s customer base is not necessarily defined by the village. Conceptually we might therefore expect some spatial spillover. Here we present a complementary analysis that takes spatial issues into account.

The analysis is based on the following features of the intervention.

1. The NGO saleswoman only competes for customers located within the village of the drug store, because of her catchment area restriction. Since she does not go door-to-door to other villages, she does not compete for those customers. When the NGO enters a given village it potentially “steals” away customers located in that village, who switch from incumbent drug stores to the NGO.
2. Any given drug store can sell to households that live anywhere.

3. In practice, the customer base of a drug store is thus defined by some radius $X$ around the store. (We obviously do not know exactly how the customer base relates to distance, and so we empirically explore various distances.)

4. Because the drug store can have a share of its customer base consisting of households living outside the village, it can lose customers to NGO saleswomen operating in nearby villages.

5. Together, the competitive pressure of the NGO as a whole for a drug store is increasing in the share of its customers that overlap with the catchment area of all NGO saleswomen.

The regression specification is the following:

$$y_{id} = \sum_{D=1}^{3} \beta^D \times NGOCompetition^D_{id} + \theta X_{id} + \delta_c + \epsilon_{id}$$

where $y$ is some outcome (e.g., drug quality) for drug store $i$, located in district $c$. $NGOCompetition^D_{id}$ is the share of the customer base of drug store $i$ that overlaps with catchment areas of all NGO saleswomen. We define the customer base as households living within a certain distance $D$ from the drug store. In particular, we allow for effects up to 7.5 km, using three intervals each consisting of 2.5 km radius bandwidth: 0-2.5 km, 2.5-5 km, 5-7.5 km. We might expect effects to be monotonically decreasing in distance, since the customer base should be a function of walking distance for households (depending on walking path conditions, it would take approximately 1-1.5 hours to walk back and forth to a drug store 2.5 km away). Since households are not uniformly distributed across space, we use high resolution satellite data on the population distribution in order to measure what share of the population within a certain distance of a drug store happens to overlap with catchment areas of the NGO saleswomen.\(^{60}\) In all specifications, we include district fixed effect (since randomization was stratified by districts). We also always include controls for the expected NGO competition, at each distance. That is, given that each randomization procedure specifies an equal likelihood that a given village will be

\(^{60}\)We use the High-Resolution Settlement Layer data, at a spatial resolution of 30 meters, available to download from https://www.ciesin.columbia.edu/data/hrsl/. The catchment areas of saleswomen are defined by the village boundaries. As there are no digitized maps of these boundaries, we use the convex hull of households in each village from our survey data. Thus, we may have some measurement area, but this would tend to lead to attenuation bias if the error is classical, which seems reasonable in this case.
selected into treatment and control group, this effectively controls for any determinants related to the locations of the drug stores (e.g., some drug stores are located far away from high population density areas), so that the randomization realization is exogenous conditional on the control.

The results are available in Appendix C, Table C.3 and Figure C.3. Using this approach, we see that drug stores which have a greater share of their customer base nearby (within 2.5 km) overlapping with NGO saleswomen sell higher quality drugs at lower prices, on average. The effect dissipates at longer distances, as expected. These results confirm the basic story of the paper where nearby presence of NGO saleswomen induces higher quality drugs in the market.
Appendix C: Figures and Tables

Figure C.1: Structure of Empirical Investigation

### 1. Supply-Side: NGO enters
- a) Quality
- b) Exit
- c) Price

### 2. Supply-Side: Incumbent Responses
- d) E[Quality]

### 3. Demand-Side: Household Responses
- e) Quantity (All)
- f) Quantity (Shops)

**Note:** The figure provides an overview of the empirical investigation. The NGO entered villages, randomly in treatment and control villages, selling authentic antimalarial drugs (ACTs) at a price below most incumbents. We first study the response by incumbent drug stores in terms of **quality** (whether the store sells fake ACT drugs), **exit** (whether the store sells ACT drugs at all) and **price**. We then examine responses among households in terms of beliefs, i.e. **expected quality** (whether the household believes the nearest drug store sells fake ACT drugs), and **quantity** demanded (number of ACT pills purchased during sickness episodes). The graphs show raw means and the associated 95 percent confidence intervals across treatment and control groups.
Figure C.2: Equilibrium strategy for an incumbent with the NGO in the market

\[ p_t = p_t^H \]

Panel A: No price subsidy
- Incumbent switches from \( q_1 = 0 \) to \( q_1 = 1 \)
- Incumbent chooses \( q_1 = 0 \) and exit after first period

Panel B: Price subsidy
- Incumbent chooses \( q_1 = 0 \) and exit after first period

Note: The figure shows the opportunistic incumbent’s equilibrium strategy as function of the incumbent’s cost of supplying high quality drugs (c) when facing competition from the NGO. In panel A, the NGO sells high quality drugs without a subsidy (\( \omega = 0 \)) and \( p_t^D = p_t^H = p_1^* \), where \( p_1^* \) is the period 1 monopoly price. In panel B, the NGO sells high quality drugs with a subsidy (\( 0 < \omega < 1 \)) and \( p_t^D = p_t^H = p_1^*(1 - \omega) \). High cost incumbents are more likely to exit the market when faced with competition from the NGO if the NGO sells high quality drugs with a subsidy.

Figure C.3: Treatment effect on drug quality as a function of distance

Note: The figure shows the treatment effect on drug quality as a function of distance. Specifically, using the drug store as the unit of analysis, it is the estimated effect of the share of the population overlapping with catchment areas of NGO saleswomen, at the specified distances. The results indicate that the NGO effect disappears after approximately 5km.
Figure C.4: Effects by distance to wholesalers

Note: Binscatter plots of the likelihood of drug stores selling fake drugs by treatment status of the village of the drug store. The x-axis captures the logged relative distance of traveling from the village to Kampala compared to the district capital, using Google Maps. Variables are residualized, controlling for branch fixed effect and baseline covariates. The patterns in the control group suggest that when the costs of acquiring high quality drugs versus low quality drugs from wholesalers are relatively high, prevalence of low-quality drugs is greater, and that the effect of the NGO is primarily driven by those villages with relatively high costs. One cannot, however, statistically reject that the two slopes are statistically equal.
Figure C.5: Spatial correlation of prices

Note: Figure depicts a binscatter plot of pairwise price differences between all control shops as a function of distance between them. The x-axis measure logged kilometers and the y-axis measure the absolute price difference in logged prices (enabling a percent interpretation).

Figure C.6: Price differences in villages with multiple shops

Note: Figure plots the raw data for all the pairwise combinations of control shops within 500 meters of each other. X-axis measure the absolute price difference in logged prices.
Figure C.7: Household beliefs of fake drugs as a function of purchasing pattern and actual share of fake drugs in the village.

Note: Figures plot beliefs that the nearest drug shop sells fake drugs as a function of the share of households which normally buy their ACT medicine from private drug shops (a) and the share of fake drugs in the village (b) the share of households that believe the nearest private drug shop sell fake ACTs.
Figure C.8: Prices, beliefs and sourcing choices as a function on the within-village number of shop

Note: Figures (a)-(d) plot prices, beliefs and sourcing choices by the number of shops in control villages. The y-axis in (a) is the share of households which normally buy their ACT medicine from private drug shops; in (b) the share of households that believe the nearest private drug shop sell fake ACTs; in (c) and (d) the average price regardless of brands, or conditional on only the most popular brand Lonart, respectively. The figures show there are no obvious systematic differences as a function of the number of private shops.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample of Shops</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>Sold ACT</th>
<th>Sold ACT</th>
<th>Sold ACT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependent Variable:</td>
<td>Drug store sells fake drugs, dummy</td>
<td>% Fake drugs</td>
<td>A majority of drugs are fake, dummy</td>
<td>Drug store sells fake drugs, dummy</td>
<td>% Fake drugs</td>
<td>A majority of drugs are fake, dummy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO entry</td>
<td>-0.169**</td>
<td>-8.87**</td>
<td>-0.108**</td>
<td>-0.217**</td>
<td>-11.93**</td>
<td>-0.149**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.066)</td>
<td>(3.58)</td>
<td>(0.043)</td>
<td>(0.087)</td>
<td>(4.83)</td>
<td>(0.057)</td>
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<td>135</td>
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<td>0.107</td>
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<td>0.131</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dep. Var. Mean in Control</td>
<td>0.263</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>0.138</td>
<td>0.368</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>0.193</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The unit of analysis is a drug store. In columns 1-3, the sample contains all stores identified during the baseline drug store census. In columns 4-6, the sample consists of stores that sold ACT at the time of the drug quality survey. The dependent variables are: in columns 1 and 4, a dummy indicating if the drug store sold failed drugs during the quality survey, and zero otherwise (including cases where the store was not open or did not sell ACT); in columns 2 and 5, the percent of tested drugs that failed (in column 2, this is also zero for drug stores that did not sell any drugs); in columns 3 and 6, a dummy indicating if the majority of tested drugs failed, and zero otherwise (including cases where the store did not sell ACT in column 3). Note that column 1 replicates the regression from the baseline estimates in Table 4, column 5, for ease of comparison. NGO entry is a dummy variable equal to one if there is a door-to-door NGO distributor selling ACT drugs in the village, and zero otherwise. The control variables are the same as in Table 4. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the village level. *** 1% , ** 5% , * 10% significance.
### Table C.2. Heterogenous Effects of NGO Entry on Quality in Drug Stores, by Baseline Competition in the Village

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample of Shops</th>
<th>Drug store sells fake drugs, dummy</th>
<th>% Fake drugs</th>
<th>A majority of drugs are fake, dummy</th>
<th>Drug store sells fake drugs, dummy</th>
<th>% Fake drugs</th>
<th>A majority of drugs are fake, dummy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO entry</td>
<td>-0.175**</td>
<td>-9.25**</td>
<td>-0.121**</td>
<td>-0.239**</td>
<td>-13.37**</td>
<td>-0.175***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.076)</td>
<td>(4.31)</td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
<td>(0.099)</td>
<td>(5.52)</td>
<td>(0.059)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village Monopoly at Baseline</td>
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<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.060</td>
<td>-3.95</td>
<td>0.007</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(8.30)</td>
<td>(0.109)</td>
<td>(0.208)</td>
<td>(11.01)</td>
<td>(0.150)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO entry * Village Monopoly at Baseline</td>
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<td>1.81</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>0.096</td>
<td>7.83</td>
<td>0.121</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.184)</td>
<td>(9.68)</td>
<td>(0.129)</td>
<td>(0.251)</td>
<td>(12.32)</td>
<td>(0.183)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>135</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>93</td>
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<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
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<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.110</td>
<td>0.111</td>
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<td>Drug shops</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>District FE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dep. Var. Mean in Control</td>
<td>0.263</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>0.138</td>
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<td>18.9</td>
<td>0.193</td>
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## Table C.3. Effects of NGO Entry: Spatial Effects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample of Drug Shops:</th>
<th>Drug store sells fake drugs, dummy</th>
<th>Drug store exit, dummy</th>
<th>Drug store sells fake drugs, dummy</th>
<th>Log Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All villages, all stores</td>
<td>All villages, stores with ACT sold</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent Variable:</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO Competition, 0 - 2.5km</td>
<td>-0.119</td>
<td>-0.124</td>
<td>-0.084</td>
<td>-0.075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S.E. Spatial Dependence: &lt; 2.5 km</td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S.E. Spatial Dependence: &lt; 5 km</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S.E. Spatial Dependence: &lt; 7.5 km</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td>(0.055)</td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S.E. White</td>
<td>(0.072)</td>
<td>(0.078)</td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO Competition, 2.5 - 5 km</td>
<td>-0.090</td>
<td>-0.095</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>-0.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.070)</td>
<td>(0.063)</td>
<td>(0.053)</td>
<td>(0.093)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S.E. Spatial Dependence: &lt; 2.5 km</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S.E. Spatial Dependence: &lt; 5 km</td>
<td>(0.041)</td>
<td>(0.043)</td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S.E. Spatial Dependence: &lt; 7.5 km</td>
<td>(0.100)</td>
<td>(0.126)</td>
<td>(0.073)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S.E. White</td>
<td>(0.127)</td>
<td>(0.170)</td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO Competition, 5 - 7.5 km</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
<td>-0.022</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
<td>(0.058)</td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S.E. Spatial Dependence: &lt; 5 km</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S.E. Spatial Dependence: &lt; 7.5 km</td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S.E. Huber-White</td>
<td>(0.077)</td>
<td>(0.083)</td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.292</td>
<td>0.300</td>
<td>0.292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>District FE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expected NGO Competition</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Village Controls &amp; Additional Spatial Controls</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dep. Var. Mean</td>
<td>0.214</td>
<td>0.214</td>
<td>0.214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.304</td>
<td>0.304</td>
<td>9.015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The unit of analysis is a drug store. In columns 1-4 the sample is all drug stores with GPS data at baseline (131 out of 135 stores; data lacking for 4 stores). In columns 5-8 the sample is all drug stores that sold ACT with GPS data at baseline (92 out of 93 stores). For each drug store, NGO Competition for customers is measured within distance d, where d is: 0 - 2.5 km, 2.5-5 km or 5-7.5 km. It is defined as the log population share within the distance d from the drug store that are locate within the catchment area, i.e. the village boundaries, of the NGO. This measure is based on the fact that the CHP is allowed to sell only to the population within the village boundaries. Drug stores face no such constraint. In order to the maintain random assignment, all regressions control for Expected NGO Competition, i.e. the expected value of NGO Competition before the randomized implementation of the NGO intervention was implemented, for each distance. The village controls are the same as before. Additional Spatial Controls are the logged population within 7.5 km of the drug store and the spatial competition at baseline from other stores shops, defined as the population share within 7.5km of the drug store which also are located within 7.5 km of another drug store at baseline. OLS regressions, with Conley (1999) standard errors in parentheses which account for spatial dependence. It allows for a linearly decreasing spatial dependence up to a cutoff, 2.5/5/7.5 km respectively.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample of Shops</th>
<th>Drug store sells fake drugs, dummy</th>
<th>% Fake drugs</th>
<th>A majority of drugs are fake, dummy</th>
<th>Drug store sells fake drugs, dummy</th>
<th>% Fake drugs</th>
<th>A majority of drugs are fake, dummy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO entry</td>
<td>-0.172***</td>
<td>-9.16**</td>
<td>-0.112***</td>
<td>-0.214**</td>
<td>-12.11**</td>
<td>-0.149**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.064)</td>
<td>(3.50)</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>(0.090)</td>
<td>(5.06)</td>
<td>(0.060)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Population Believing Drugs are Fake at Baseline, Std.</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>-0.45</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.068)</td>
<td>(3.80)</td>
<td>(0.045)</td>
<td>(0.089)</td>
<td>(4.77)</td>
<td>(0.062)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO entry * % of Population Believing Drugs are Fake at Baseline, Std.</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>3.68</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>9.38*</td>
<td>0.124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.078)</td>
<td>(4.18)</td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
<td>(0.114)</td>
<td>(5.34)</td>
<td>(0.074)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.123</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District FE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dep. Var. Mean in Control</td>
<td>0.263</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>0.138</td>
<td>0.368</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>0.193</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The unit of analysis is a drug store. In columns 1-3, the sample contains all shops identified during the baseline drug store census. In columns 4-6, the sample consists of stores that sold ACT at the time of the drug quality survey. The dependent variables are: in columns 1 and 4, a dummy indicating if the drug store sold failed drugs during the quality survey, and zero otherwise (including cases where the store was not open or did not sell ACT); in columns 2 and 5, the percent of tested drugs that failed (which is zero for drug stores that did not sell any drugs in column 2); in columns 3 and 6, a dummy indicating if the majority of tested drugs failed, and zero otherwise (including cases where the store did not sell ACT in column 3). "NGO entry" is a dummy variable equal to one if there is a door-to-door NGO distributor selling ACT drugs in the village, and zero otherwise. "% of Population Believing Drugs are Fake at Baseline, Std." is the percent of the baseline survey respondents in the village of the drug store that answered they think the nearest drug store sells fake drugs; this variable is standardized to mean zero and standard deviation one in the drug store sample for ease of interpretation. The control variables are the same as in Table 4. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the village level. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance.
Table C.5. Effects of NGO Entry: Beliefs about Efficacy of Malaria Medicines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable:</th>
<th>Believes ACT is highly effective, dummy</th>
<th>Believes non-ACT drugs are highly effective, dummy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OLS</td>
<td>OLS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO entry</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>653</td>
<td>653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit of Analysis</td>
<td>HH</td>
<td>HH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample of villages</td>
<td>Shops at baseline</td>
<td>Shops at baseline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of villages</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District FE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dep. Var. Mean, Control</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Data from the endline household survey conducted in 48 randomly sampled villages (column 1 and 3), or the subset of villages that had shops at baseline (column 2 and 4). The dependent variable captures whether the respondent answers "highly effective" to the question "How effective do you think that this medicine is in treating malaria today?" (options: highly effective, somewhat effective, not effective). The non-ACT medicines are Chloroquine, Quinine, and SP, and the dummies in columns 3-4 are equal to one if the respondent answers highly effective to at least one of the drugs. The control variables are the same as in tables 3-8. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the village level. *** 1% , ** 5%, * 10% significance.